Department of Revenue v. Selles
47 So. 3d 916
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- DOR appeals a DOAH/ALJ final order requiring a mother to pay child support where DOR contends it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
- DOR is the Title IV-D agency authorized to establish child support obligations administratively under section 409.2563, absent a judicial determination.
- DOR proceeded on behalf of Wendy R. Smith to obtain support from Ephraim Selles; the mother was designated the parent from whom support was not being sought.
- DOR proposed an administrative order naming Selles to pay to the child’s caregiver grandmother, Hazel Phillips, and also proposed that Smith pay to Phillips.
- The ALJ issued a Final Administrative Paternity and Support Order directing Selles to pay Phillips and Smith to pay Phillips; the DOR appeal challenges both assignments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ had subject matter jurisdiction to require Smith to pay child support | Smith (via DOR) lacks authority to order support from the parent from whom support is not being sought | DOR/ALJ acted within statutory IV-D framework to establish support obligations | No; Smith cannot be ordered to pay under §409.2563. |
| Whether ALJ had authority to redirect Selles' payments to Phillips for the child’s benefit | DOR could redirect支 payments to the caretaker under §409.2558(8) | Statutory framework permits redirection when child resides with another; DOR can direct payments in such cases | Yes; redirect to Phillips affirmed. |
| Whether the proceedings could be maintained on behalf of the custodial parent and not erroneously expand to others | DOR proceeded on behalf of Smith; others were not proper parties | In IV-D context, DOR may act for a parent to establish obligations; other issues may be addressed | Affirmed insofar as only Selles’ payment to Phillips is proper; Smith’s payment is reversed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rinella v. Abifaraj, 908 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (agency power limited to statutory grant; cannot expand jurisdiction)
- State, Dept. of Envtl. Regulation v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (jurisdiction determined by statute; cannot be conferred by consent)
- Seven Hills, Inc. v. Bentley, 848 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (jurisdiction reviewed de novo; lack may be raised on appeal)
- MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (jurisdictional issues may be raised on appeal; cannot be waived by acquiescence)
- Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 834 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (statutory construction to give meaning; avoid expanding terms)
- Armour v. Allen, 377 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (support is a dual obligation; courts may order both parents in circuit court)
- Morris v. Swanson, 940 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (dual parental obligation; IV-D is supplementary; courts open for relief)