Department of Revenue Ex Rel. Tisdale v. Jackson
217 So. 3d 192
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Jackson was adjudicated the legal father in 1999 and ordered to pay child support to Tisdale.
- The child turned 18 on December 17, 2015, but remained living with Tisdale, was financially dependent, and was still enrolled in high school.
- The child was a successful student performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduating before turning 19 (on track to graduate June 2016; record indicates graduation in May 2016).
- DOR (on behalf of Tisdale) filed a petition on January 6, 2016, seeking to extend child support until the child’s high school graduation under § 743.07(2) (high school exception).
- The hearing officer and trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding DOR lacked standing because the petition was filed after the child’s 18th birthday.
- The Fifth District reversed, holding DOR had standing to seek extension under the high school provision even though the petition was filed after the child turned 18, and remanded for further proceedings on extension and arrears.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOR has standing to seek extension of child support under § 743.07(2) when petition is filed after child turns 18 | DOR: Yes — high school exception allows parent/agency to seek extension even if filed after 18th birthday | Jackson: No — obligation ended on child’s 18th birthday; petition filed too late | Court held DOR has standing; petition timely for purposes of high school provision and subject-matter jurisdiction exists |
| Whether support based on high school attendance may be extended post-majority | DOR: Support can be extended until graduation if child is 18–19 and in high school performing in good faith | Jackson: Extension not allowed because child already reached majority | Court held statute permits extension for an 18-year-old still in high school meeting statutory criteria |
| Whether Larwa (Roush) controls to require an independent action by the child where petition filed post-majority | Jackson relied on Larwa to argue DOR lacked authority | DOR argued Larwa is distinguishable because Larwa involved mental incapacity, not high school attendance | Court found Larwa distinguishable; Larwa does not bar parental/agency petitions under the high school provision |
| Whether remand should allow consideration of arrearages for the post‑majority/high‑school period | DOR: Court should consider arrearages for period between 18th birthday and graduation | Jackson: (implicit) oppose obligation for that period | Court instructed remand to reconsider extension and entertain petitions for arrearages as appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Department of Revenue ex rel. Hobbs v. Lockmiller, 791 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (DOR had standing to seek continuing support under high school provision though petition filed after child turned 18)
- Bloom v. Panchyshyn, 200 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (rejecting argument that a petition filed after the child turned 18 is insufficient to seek extension under high school provision)
- Campagna v. Cope, 971 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (permitting parent to seek retroactive child support by petition filed after child turned 18 under § 743.07(2))
- Henderson v. Henderson, 882 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (same: parent permitted to seek extension under high school provision filed post‑majority)
- Larwa v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Roush, 169 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (extension based on mental incapacity requires independent action by the emancipated but dependent child; distinguishable from high school cases)