Department of Education v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551

In Sept. 2022 the Education Secretary, invoking the HEROES Act, announced a large-scale student‑loan forgiveness plan discharging $10,000–$20,000 per eligible borrower based on 2020–2021 income and Pell‑grant history.
The HEROES Act authorizes waivers/modifications to student‑financial‑assistance provisions and exempts actions taken under it from negotiated‑rulemaking and APA notice‑and‑comment requirements.
Brown (whose loans are commercially held and thus excluded from the Plan) and Taylor (eligible but limited to $10,000 because he never received a Pell Grant) sued, claiming the Department must follow negotiated rulemaking and notice‑and‑comment because the HEROES Act does not substantively authorize the Plan.
The District Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument about the scope of the HEROES Act’s procedural exemptions but held the Plan substantively unauthorized and vacated it; the government sought certiorari before judgment.
The Supreme Court granted review but held the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing—specifically failing the traceability requirement—and therefore did not reach the merits; the District Court judgment was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing (traceability)	Brown/Taylor: denial of desired HEA‑based relief is traceable to the Department’s adoption of the Plan and the deprivation of procedural protections	DOE: plaintiffs’ injury (lack of HEA relief) is not caused by the Plan; connection is speculative and discretionary	Plaintiffs lack standing; injury is not fairly traceable to the Plan; Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Scope of HEROES Act procedural exemptions	HEROES Act exempts procedures only for actions that are substantively authorized by the Act	DOE: exemptions permit bypassing negotiated rulemaking and notice/comment for actions the Secretary deems necessary under HEROES Act	Not decided on the merits—Court declined to reach because plaintiffs lacked standing
Redressability (vacatur leading to HEA relief)	Vacating Plan could prompt DOE to adopt HEA‑based forgiveness that would benefit plaintiffs	DOE: any shift to HEA relief is discretionary and speculative; vacatur does not compel HEA action	Too speculative; vacatur would not likely redress plaintiffs’ asserted injury

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishes standing elements: injury, causation, redressability)
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural‑rights standing requires a concrete interest affected by deprivation)
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (speculative chain of causation insufficient for standing)
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (attenuated causation does not satisfy traceability)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing requires particularized injury, not generalized grievance)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (injury in fact must be concrete and particularized)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (administrative procedures and reviewability principles)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (court must ensure plaintiff has Article III standing before reaching merits)