183 So. 3d 1177
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Child born March 2009; sheltered from mother in March 2011 and placed with father briefly; parents consented to dependency in April 2011.
- Father absconded with child to North Carolina during a four-month custody period in 2011; child then placed with maternal grandmother and half-sister in Broward County.
- Father arrested in August 2012 in North Carolina for violent felonies, convicted, and given a sentence with anticipated release in August 2019 (child ~10 at release).
- Since removal in 2011 the father had virtually no contact with the child except one letter; child lives with and is bonded to grandmother (who wants to adopt) and half-sister (already adopted by grandmother).
- Department filed to terminate both parents’ rights; trial court denied termination as to father (finding incarceration period not a "significant portion" and continued relationship not contrary to child’s best interests) but found statutory grounds against mother; nonetheless denied single-parent termination and kept mother’s rights.
- Fourth District reversed, holding the trial court erred by failing to make statutorily required qualitative findings and that clear-and-convincing evidence supported termination of both parents’ rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCF/Statewide GAL) | Defendant's Argument (Father/Mother) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether father’s expected incarceration constitutes a "significant portion" of the child’s minority under § 39.806(1)(d)1. | Length of incarceration (through child’s age ~10) plus child’s need for permanency means incarceration is a significant portion and supports termination. | Father: quantitative timing close; he had been part of child’s life; completed parenting class; limited contact due to prison conditions; no showing of harm. | Reversed: court erred by omitting qualitative findings about child’s need for a permanent, stable home; record shows incarceration will significantly impair child’s permanency—termination required. |
| Whether continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated father would be harmful to the child under § 39.806(1)(d)3. | Statutory factors (age, lack of parent-child relationship, nonprovision of care, violent criminal history, prolonged unavailability) show continued relationship would be harmful; termination is in child’s best interest. | Father: no evidence of direct harm to child; limited ability to contact while incarcerated; some support via Social Security benefits. | Reversed: trial court failed to analyze the statutory factors; record establishes lack of relationship, failure to provide for child, violent criminal history, and harm to permanency—termination required. |
| Whether mother’s parental rights could remain after father’s rights denied (single-parent termination statutes) | Once father’s rights terminated, mother’s earlier statutory failures (abandonment, failure to comply with case plan) warrant termination as well. | Mother argued court correctly denied single-parent termination due to insufficient evidence for single-parent termination standard. | Reversed: because father’s rights must be terminated, remand directs termination of mother’s rights under the statutory grounds the trial court found (abandonment and case-plan breaches). |
Key Cases Cited
- D.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (statute requires both quantitative and qualitative inquiry into incarceration’s effect on child’s permanency)
- B.C. v. Florida Department of Children and Families, 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004) (incarceration length must be considered with effect on parent-child relationship; termination must be manifestly in child's best interest)
- L.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 20 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (trial court must consider and address statutorily mandated factors in findings)
- B.K. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (upholding termination where incarcerated parent had minimal contact and child would otherwise lack permanency)