258 N.C. App. 382
N.C. Ct. App.2018Background
- DOT recorded a Transportation Corridor Map on 26 Nov 2008 that (per Kirby decisions) effected an inverse condemnation taking of certain property rights for the Northern Beltway Project.
- Robert Stimpson (Defendant) filed an inverse‑condemnation complaint on 9 May 2016 under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136‑111, seeking a declaration of taking and compensation (including a fee‑simple valuation if appropriate).
- The trial court in the consolidated Beroth proceedings found DOT liable for an inverse taking and set procedures (plating, appraisals, deposits) under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 136‑108, 136‑111 and 136‑114 to prepare for the Section 108 hearing.
- On 13 Dec 2016 DOT filed a direct condemnation complaint and declaration of taking under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136‑103 (depositing an estimated value), after Stimpson’s inverse action was pending.
- Stimpson moved to dismiss DOT’s direct action as abated by the prior pending inverse action; the trial court dismissed DOT’s complaint (23 Feb 2017) and denied DOT’s Rule 60(b) motion (25 Apr 2017).
- DOT appealed; the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED dismissal, holding the prior‑pending‑action doctrine applied and that Article 9’s procedures permit the trial court to manage counterclaims/case coordination under § 136‑114.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOT could proceed with a direct condemnation under §136‑103 while an inverse‑condemnation action under §136‑111 was pending | DOT: §136‑103 authorizes DOT to file a condemnation at any time; filing a direct action after deciding to condemn is lawful even if an inverse action is pending | Stimpson: The prior pending inverse action (same property, same parties, same ultimate relief) abates DOT’s subsequent direct action | Court: Prior pending action doctrine applies; DOT’s direct action was properly dismissed (but without prejudice to asserting a counterclaim in the prior action) |
| Whether the trial court erred in dismissing DOT’s direct action instead of allowing DOT to pursue parallel proceedings | DOT: Dismissal prevents DOT from exercising its statutory condemnation power and interferes with project needs | Stimpson: Parallel proceedings would cause multiplicity and confusion; Article 9 contemplates inverse actions where DOT failed to file a declaration of taking | Court: Article 9 and judicial discretion under §136‑114 allow the court to coordinate proceedings; simultaneous direct and inverse litigation on the same property is not required and dismissal was appropriate |
| Whether DOT could not be required to bring its claim as a counterclaim in the prior action | DOT: Article 9 does not compel filing a counterclaim; §136‑103 is separate and unambiguous | Stimpson: Rule 13 and §136‑114 permit the court to require related claims be litigated together | Court: §136‑114 grants the trial court power to adapt procedures; dismissal without prejudice to DOT filing a counterclaim was proper (court may require coordination) |
| Whether denial of DOT’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was an abuse of discretion | DOT: Dismissal was erroneous, so relief from judgment was warranted | Stimpson: No error in dismissal; no basis for vacatur | Court: Because dismissal was correct, denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief was not an abuse of discretion; order affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 367 N.C. 333 (2014) (holding corridor map recordation effected a taking and addressing Map Act takings framework)
- Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 368 N.C. 847 (2016) (recordation of corridor maps effected takings of fundamental property rights)
- Berta v. Highway Comm’n, 36 N.C. App. 749 (1978) (taking established under §136‑111 is deemed to occur when the injurious act to property occurred)
- Smith v. City of Charlotte, 79 N.C. App. 517 (1986) (inverse condemnation compels governmental exercise of eminent domain and §136 procedures apply)