Dentrell Brown v. Richard Brown
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13063
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- This is an appeal concerning whether Indiana prisoners can use the Martinez/Trevino equitable exception to overcome procedural default of trial-counsel ineffective-assistance (Strickland) claims in federal habeas corpus.
- Federal habeas review is ordinarily barred unless state remedies were exhausted; procedural defaults may be excused only for cause (Coleman).
- Martinez and Trevino created a narrow exception allowing ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to overcome default when state law or practice effectively prevents raising them on direct appeal.
- A 3-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit held that Martinez/Trevino applies to Indiana prisoners, allowing certain defaulted Strickland claims to proceed in federal court.
- Judges Sykes and Easterbrook dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the panel improperly expanded Martinez/Trevino because Indiana permits Strickland claims on direct appeal and provides procedures (Woods) to develop the record.
- The dissent relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Davila (and other precedent) to emphasize Martinez/Trevino is narrow and should not be extended to Indiana’s context; the petition for rehearing en banc was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino exception applies to defaulted Strickland claims by Indiana prisoners | Martinez/Trevino should apply because postconviction procedures often determine whether default blocks federal review | Indiana does not move Strickland claims outside direct appeal; state law and Woods permit direct-review Strickland claims and fact development | Panel said Martinez/Trevino applies; en banc rehearing was denied (dissent would reverse) |
| Whether attorney error in state postconviction proceedings can constitute "cause" to excuse procedural default | Error by postconviction counsel can be cause under Martinez when state law/channeling makes collateral review the primary vehicle | Coleman bars attorney-error-as-cause for postconviction counsel unless Martinez/Trevino narrow exception applies; Indiana’s practice does not trigger it | The controversy remains: panel applied the exception; dissent argues Coleman controls and exception doesn’t apply here |
| Whether Indiana law requires Strickland claims on collateral review or forecloses effective presentation on direct appeal | Petitioner: Indiana practice effectively forces reliance on collateral proceedings | Brown/State: Indiana explicitly permits Strickland claims on direct appeal and provides procedures (Woods) to develop record | Dissent: Indiana falls outside Trevino rationale; panel reached opposite conclusion |
| Whether Davila supports limiting expansion of Martinez/Trevino | Petitioner: Davila’s limitation of Martinez/Trevino to narrow contexts cautions against expansion | Respondent: Panel nonetheless found Indiana circumstances warrant applying the exception | Court denied rehearing en banc; dissent invoked Davila to argue against expansion |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural default and cause standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrow exception allowing cause for defaulted Strickland claims when state requires collateral presentation)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (extension of Martinez where state practice effectively foreclosed direct review)
- Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (Supreme Court stressing Martinez/Trevino is narrow and cautioning against expansion)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (federal habeas and comity/finality principles)
- Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (federal habeas costs to federalism)
- Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998) (Indiana permits direct-appeal Strickland claims and provides record-development procedures)
