Dentrell Brown v. Richard Brown
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1795
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Dentrell Brown (13 at the time) and Joshua Love (19) were tried jointly in Indiana for the 2008 murder of Gerald Wenger; both were convicted and Brown sentenced to 60 years. Key prosecution evidence was jailhouse witness Mario Morris’s testimony recounting separate out‑of‑court statements by Love and by Brown. Morris’s recounting of Love’s statement implicated Love alone; his recounting of Brown’s statement implicated Brown alone.
- Brown’s direct appeal argued a Bruton/Confrontation Clause claim; the Indiana appellate court rejected it, finding Morris’s testimony did not identify a third party in each confession. Brown’s post‑conviction counsel raised only a severance claim (tied to Bruton) and did not assert that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction under Indiana Evidence Rule 105.
- Brown filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction restricting Love’s statement (as offered through Morris) to Love. The district court dismissed, finding the ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claim procedurally defaulted and that Martinez/Trevino did not apply in Indiana.
- The Seventh Circuit majority holds that the Martinez v. Ryan / Trevino v. Thaler doctrine applies in Indiana because Indiana’s procedural design and practice (Woods, the Davis‑Hatton procedure, and state court guidance discouraging direct‑appeal Strickland claims) make meaningful direct‑appeal development of most Strickland claims unlikely.
- The court finds Brown has proffered evidence that (1) his post‑conviction counsel’s performance may have been deficient for failing to raise the limiting‑instruction Strickland claim, and (2) the underlying trial‑counsel Strickland claim is “substantial” (i.e., has some merit), so Brown is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on both the Martinez gateway and, if excused, the Strickland merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brown) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino equitable exception to procedural default applies in Indiana | Indiana’s practice effectively channels Strickland claims to collateral review so Martinez/Trevino should apply | Martinez/Trevino do not apply; Indiana permits direct appeal and Davis‑Hatton provides a mechanism | Held: Martinez/Trevino applies in Indiana because procedural design and systemic operation make meaningful direct appeal of Strickland claims unlikely |
| Whether Brown showed cause to excuse procedural default of his Strickland claim | Post‑conviction counsel was deficient for not raising trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction | Post‑conviction counsel’s choices were reasonable and the claim lacks merit | Held: Brown has proffered sufficient evidence of deficient post‑conviction counsel to warrant an evidentiary hearing on that issue |
| Whether the underlying Strickland claim (failure to request limiting instruction) is substantial | Morris’s testimony admitted Love’s statement (admissible against Love) but that same testimony was inadmissible hearsay as to Brown; without it, evidence against Brown is weak — counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction was prejudicial | State contends evidence against Brown was adequate and counsel’s performance was reasonable | Held: The Strickland claim is substantial (some merit) on the record presented; prejudice and deficiency warrant further factfinding at an evidentiary hearing |
| Remedy / procedural disposition | Remand for evidentiary hearing to decide (1) whether post‑conviction counsel was ineffective; and if so (2) the merits of the Strickland claim | Opposed; sought dismissal of habeas petition | Held: Reversed dismissal; remanded for an evidentiary hearing on both gateway (Martinez) and, if excused, Strickland merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co‑defendant’s out‑of‑court statements may violate confrontation rights when introduced against another defendant)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness can constitute cause to excuse procedural default where state law requires Strickland claims in initial collateral review)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extends Martinez where state procedural design and operation make meaningful direct‑appeal development of Strickland claims unlikely)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default doctrine and limits on attorney‑error excuse)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for certificate of appealability; threshold showing that jurists could debate correctness)
- Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998) (Indiana rule: Strickland claims may be raised on direct appeal but are normally preferred in post‑conviction proceedings; Davis‑Hatton procedure discussed)