225 So. 3d 12
Miss. Ct. App.2017Background
- On August 22, 2014, Dennis Tyrell Miller killed his girlfriend and was later convicted of manslaughter by a jury.
- At sentencing the State proved three prior felonies: sale of cocaine (1998), burglary of a dwelling (1998), and burglary of a building (1999), each sentenced to and served terms over one year.
- The trial court sentenced Miller as a "violent habitual offender" under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (life without parole) because one prior felony was a "crime of violence" as defined by § 97-3-2. § 97-3-2 was amended effective July 1, 2014 to classify burglary of a dwelling as a per se crime of violence.
- Miller was sentenced after the § 97-3-2 amendment (the killing occurred August 22, 2014). On appeal he challenged application of the amended definition and—only in his reply brief—argued the enhancement violated state and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses.
- The majority affirmed, holding the enhanced sentence is an aggravated punishment for Miller’s post-amendment offense, not an unconstitutional ex post facto penalty for his prior burglary. A dissent would reverse, arguing the amendment retroactively changes the nature of Miller’s 1998 conviction and thus violates ex post facto and possibly Sixth Amendment principles.
Issues
| Issue | Miller's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller’s prior burglary of a dwelling qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 99-19-83 after the 2014 amendment to § 97-3-2 | § 97-3-2 should not be applied to his 1998 conviction (or did not apply at time of conviction) | § 97-3-2, effective July 1, 2014, expressly classifies burglary of a dwelling as a crime of violence and applies to predicate convictions for sentencing after that date | Held: Burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence under § 97-3-2 and supports sentencing under § 99-19-83 because Miller committed the new offense after the amendment took effect |
| Whether applying the 2014 statutory "deeming" of burglary-as-violent to Miller’s prior conviction violates the federal and state Ex Post Facto Clauses | Application is retroactive and increases punishment by changing the nature of a prior conviction; Brown requires proof of actual violence for a dwelling burglary to be "violent" | Enhancement is not ex post facto because the life term is a "stiffened penalty" for Miller’s later crime (manslaughter) committed after the law change; prior convictions merely serve as predicates | Held: No Ex Post Facto violation—the enhancement punished the post-amendment offense, not retroactively punished the prior burglary |
| Whether precedent (Smith/Gryger) permits using prior convictions that predate a change in enhancement statutes | Miller: distinguish Smith/Gryger because § 97-3-2 "deems" a new substantive fact (violence) into the old conviction | State: Smith and Gryger permit using prior convictions to enhance punishment for subsequent crimes; reclassification/"deeming" is constitutionally permissible | Held: Majority follows Smith/Gryger; enhancement permitted. Dissent disagrees, viewing the change as altering the character of the prior conviction |
| Whether there are Sixth Amendment (Apprendi-type) concerns from "deeming" facts into a prior conviction | (Not argued below) Concern raised in dissent that deeming an element (violence) into a prior conviction increases penalty based on a fact not found by a jury | State: Enhancement based on prior conviction is within the prior-conviction exception to Apprendi | Held: Majority did not reach a Sixth Amendment reversal; dissent notes potential Apprendi issues but Miller did not raise them below |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. State, 102 So.3d 1087 (Miss. 2012) (prior Mississippi decision holding burglary of a dwelling was not per se a crime of violence absent proof of actual violence)
- Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999 (Miss. 1985) (habitual-offender enhancement is a "stiffened penalty" for the later crime and is not an ex post facto punishment for earlier offenses)
- Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (upholding application of a habitual criminal statute that relied on prior convictions predating the statute)
- United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to federal reclassification of prior state convictions for enhancement purposes)
- Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969) (quoted for principle that habitual-offender punishment is an aggravated penalty for a repeat offender)