Dennis Strutton v. Linda Meade
668 F.3d 549
8th Cir.2012Background
- Strutton, a civilly committed resident of MSOTC, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process violations related to treatment access and disciplinary measures.
- MSVPA/Missouri statute authorize confinement for ongoing control, care, and treatment until change in mental abnormality allows safe release; MSOTC conducts annual evaluations for release determinations.
- MSOTC’s treatment program has four phases with process groups; participation is encouraged but not strictly required for progress.
- Budgetary constraints and staffing shortages in 2006–2007 led MSOTC to modify psychoeducational offerings, downsize groups, and shift to larger process groups; process groups were reduced in frequency.
- MSOTC implemented disciplinary measures, including the Restriction Table (later a Restriction Area), linking violations to progress level setbacks and restricted movement, though residents were not physically restrained.
- Strutton’s treatment participation waned; he contested treatment reforms and claimed the disciplinary measures were constitutionally defective and that their modifications damaged his progress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing and mootness of treatment and discipline claims | Strutton’s injury is ongoing and redressable; mootness not met. | No ongoing injury and moot; claims should be dismissed. | Claims not moot; standing established; injury traceable and redressable. |
| Fundamental right to treatment and applicable standard | Youngberg professional judgment standard should apply. | No fundamental right to treatment; apply conscience-shocking standard. | No fundamental right; conscience-shocking standard applies. |
| Disciplinary measures and progress impact under due process | Restriction Table/Area adversely affected progress and shocked conscience. | Disciplinary measures were not arbitrary or egregious and allowed movement and activities. | No conscience-shocking violation; restrictions did not shock the conscience. |
| Spoliation sanctions for destroyed emails and records | Defendants failed to preserve evidence; sanctions warranted. | No bad faith or prejudice; sanctions not warranted. | District court did not abuse discretion; sanctions denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2011) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (standing, injury, and redressability framework)
- Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (professional judgment standard for treatment; safety and reasonable care)
- Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2006) (no substantive due process right to treatment absent egregious conduct)
- Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1991) (no constitutional right to psychiatric treatment for pedophilia)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (detention without treatment does not violate constitution)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (substantive due process shocks the conscience standard)
- Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985) (equitable relief and continuing confinement issues)
