Dennis Roy Redding v. State, 01-14-00536-CR

Defendant Dennis Roy Redding was indicted for murder after he shot and killed his longtime friend Mark Holcomb; jury convicted on lesser-included offense of manslaughter and sentenced to 7 years.
Critical factual dispute at trial: whether the shooting was accidental (Redding’s position and several witnesses) or intentional (one eyewitness, Redding’s son-in-law Schieffer).
Multiple witnesses described heavy drinking that evening; Redding was intoxicated, but defense did not argue intoxication caused the shooting.
Important investigative gaps: delayed and incomplete witness interviews, lost/unfinished recordings, failure to collect clothing for range testing, and defective gunshot-residue kit.
At trial the State requested a jury instruction tracking Penal Code §8.04(a) ("Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense"); defense objected that (1) no evidence linked intoxication to excusing the conduct and (2) the charge lacked an application paragraph explaining that intoxication does not relieve the State of its burden to prove the mental-state elements.
Defense also objected to repeated prosecutorial argument that the State need only prove intentional or knowing acts (focusing on conduct), not intent as to result; the court overruled objections and denied the requested explanatory instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Redding)	Held (trial court action)
1. Submission of §8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction	Instruction proper; statutory language applies and was requested by State	No evidence "from any source" that intoxication excused or precipitated the shooting; instruction unwarranted and comments on weight of evidence	Trial court gave the §8.04(a) instruction over defense objection
2. Refusal to give an application paragraph explaining §8.04(a)	Statutory language alone suffices; jury instructed with statutory text	Jury needed explicit application language clarifying intoxication cannot negate the State’s burden to prove intent/knowledge/recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt	Trial court refused to give the requested explanatory application paragraph
3. Prosecutor's closing argument misstating scienter	Argued jury should focus on Redding’s intentional/knowing acts (conduct) as determinative of guilt	Misstatement of law: murder/manslaughter are result‑oriented; culpable mental state must relate to causing death (the result), not merely intentional acts	Trial court overruled defense objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing

Taylor v. State, 885 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (§8.04(a) instruction appropriate only if evidence might lead jury to conclude intoxication excused the conduct)
Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explains §8.04(a) does not relieve State of burden to prove mental-state elements; instruction prevents intoxication evidence from altering mental-state requirement)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (preserved jury-charge error reversal standard: any harm requires reversal)
Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Almanza harm analysis: any degree of harm for preserved errors mandates reversal)
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (§8.04 prevents intoxication evidence from rebutting culpable mental state)