Dennis LeBlanc v. Randall Mathena
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20041
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 2002 Dennis LeBlanc was convicted in Virginia for rape and abduction committed at age 16 and sentenced to two life terms; he did not appeal his conviction.
- Virginia abolished traditional parole in 1994 but retained a geriatric release statute allowing conditional release at age 60 (after serving 10 years) or 65 (after 5 years).
- Virginia Parole Board regulations create a two-stage geriatric review: an Initial Review (petition may be denied without an interview or stated criteria) and, if advanced, an Assessment Review applying general parole “decision factors.”
- After Graham v. Florida (prohibiting life-without-parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders and requiring a "meaningful opportunity" for release based on maturity/rehabilitation), LeBlanc sought resentencing; Virginia state courts held geriatric release satisfied Graham.
- The federal district court granted LeBlanc’s § 2254 habeas petition, concluding the state adjudication unreasonably applied Graham; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding geriatric release does not meet Graham’s minimum requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (LeBlanc) | Defendant's Argument (Virginia) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Virginia’s geriatric release satisfies Graham’s requirement that juvenile nonhomicide offenders have an opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation | Geriatric release can be denied at Initial Review for any reason and therefore does not guarantee consideration of maturity/rehabilitation; Parole Board practice denies release mainly for crime seriousness | Angel and state procedures apply normal parole factors at Assessment Review, so juvenile maturity and rehabilitation will be considered | Held for Plaintiff: state courts unreasonably applied Graham because the Initial Review allows denials without consideration of maturity/rehabilitation, so program fails Graham’s requirement |
| Whether the opportunity for release is “meaningful” (realistic, not a remote possibility) under Graham | Geriatric release is remote: age cutoff (60) delays first eligibility decades beyond when parole would occur, lack of standards makes timing/outcome unpredictable, and historical denials rely overwhelmingly on crime seriousness | Program gives a predictable statutory path and uses normal parole decision factors; Graham left mechanism design to the States | Held for Plaintiff: not meaningful—no governing standards, late eligibility, and parole-like expectations lacking render the opportunity unrealistic |
| Whether the program accounts for lesser culpability of juveniles (youth as mitigating) | Geriatric release treats juveniles worse than adults (juveniles must serve a larger percent/years before eligibility) and does not require consideration of youth in the Initial Review | Parole decision factors (behavior, development, rehabilitation) permit consideration of youth; Angel construed state law to apply these factors | Held for Plaintiff: program fails to ensure consideration of youth’s lesser culpability because youth is not required to be considered at Initial Review and juveniles face disproportionate time-in-prison before eligibility |
| Standard of review on § 2254(d)(1): whether deference forecloses relief | LeBlanc: AEDPA deference applies but state-court adjudication was an objectively unreasonable application of Graham’s clear requirements | Virginia: Angel and the trial court reasonably applied Graham; federal courts must defer per Harrington | Held for Plaintiff: although AEDPA deference is required, the Fourth Circuit found the state-court application objectively unreasonable given Graham’s clear minimum requirements |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; States must provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles have diminished culpability; death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18)
- Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Eighth Amendment limits for juvenile capital punishment; juveniles less morally culpable)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (parole is part of rehabilitative process; standards/procedures create predictable expectations of parole)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juvenile sentencing requires consideration of youth’s characteristics; cited for principle though decided after state adjudication)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA review is highly deferential; unreasonableness is the key to federal habeas relief)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (§ 2254(d)(1) ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ standards explained)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (example of a general legal standard illustrating AEDPA deference when applied in tandem)