Dennis Johnson, Raymond Johnson v. State of Indiana, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 482

Dennis and Raymond Johnson participated in a 1996 robbery that resulted in a murder; each pleaded guilty and was sentenced in 1997 to aggregate 55-year terms.
Both later sought post-conviction relief and multiple sentence-modification petitions; petitions filed most recently were treated as requests for reentry court evaluation submitted December 19, 2013, and heard August 11, 2014.
Prior to July 1, 2014 the sentence-modification statute (I.C. § 35-38-1-17(b)) allowed modification after 365 days only "subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney."
Effective July 1, 2014 the statute was amended to remove the prosecutorial consent requirement and added new procedural limits; the 2014 criminal-code overhaul also included a savings clause (I.C. § 1-1-5.5-21) preserving penalties, crimes, and proceedings begun before the effective date.
The trial court applied the pre-2014 statute to the Johnsons (on the ground their sentences predated July 1, 2014), denied modification because the prosecutor objected, and the Johnsons appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2014 amendment to I.C. § 35-38-1-17 is remedial or procedural so it should apply retroactively to petitions filed after July 1, 2014	The Johnsons: the amendment is remedial/procedural and therefore applies to their petitions so courts may modify without prosecutor consent	State: the amendment is substantive (it grants courts new authority) and the savings clause preserves the pre-2014 rule requiring prosecutorial consent	Held: amendment is not remedial or merely procedural but substantive (it gives courts authority they lacked); thus not retroactive for sentences imposed before July 1, 2014
Whether the 2014 savings clause permits application of the revised statute to petitions by persons convicted/sentenced before July 1, 2014 (but filed after that date)	Johnsons: the revision should apply to petitions filed after July 1, 2014 even if the conviction/sentencing was earlier	State: the statutory savings clause shows the legislature intended prior penalties, crimes, and proceedings to remain governed by prior law	Held: savings clause controls; because the crimes, penalties, and proceedings began prior to the effective date, the pre-2014 statute requiring prosecutorial consent applies; denial affirmed

State v. Crocker, 385 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 1979) (an amendment that gives a court new substantive power does not apply to cases sentenced before the amendment)
Willis v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (an amendment enlarging the time to petition was procedural and could apply to petitions under the new statute)
Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 2002) (amendments that cure defects or conflicts in prior law may be remedial and applied retroactively)
State v. Fulkrod, 753 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 2001) (court lacks authority to modify after statutory period unless prosecuting attorney consents)
State v. Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694 (Ind. 2014) (trial court generally has no authority over a defendant after sentencing except as statutorily provided)
Morris v. State, 936 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (an amendment granting a court authority it did not previously have is substantive and not retroactive)
Pelley v. State, 828 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 2005) (statutes are presumed prospective unless legislature unambiguously intends retrospective effect)