Dennis J. Sallaz and Marcy Fox v. Eugene (Roy) Rice
161 Idaho 223
| Idaho | 2016Background
- Sallaz owned a 1954 Cadillac; in 1991 he recorded a lien in favor of Roy Rice and later obtained a duplicate title. Sallaz claims Rice released the lien in 1995 by signing the duplicate title. Rice later asserted the release signature was a forgery.
- In January 2011 Roy Rice (through his son Michael) repossessed the Cadillac, obtained a new title in Rice's name, and later sold the car for $25,000.
- Sallaz (joined by Marcy Fox) sued the Rices in April 2011 seeking possession or conversion damages; Rices counterclaimed, including quiet title (later amended).
- At trial the Rices introduced deposition testimony from Roy Rice that he had loaned Sallaz about $1,000, that Sallaz defaulted, and that he lawfully repossessed the car; Sallaz disputed the loan and the validity of the 1995 release signature.
- After defendants rested, Sallaz moved for a directed verdict on conversion; the district court denied the motion, the jury found for defendants on conversion, and the district court later held the defendants’ quiet-title counterclaim was moot because the car had been sold to a third party.
- The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the directed verdict, agreed the quiet-title claim was moot, and awarded attorneys’ fees to defendants on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121 as the appeal was frivolous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred denying directed verdict on conversion | Sallaz: repossession was unlawful as no demand/default shown; repossession equals conversion as a matter of law | Rices: testimony showed a loan, Sallaz defaulted, and repossession was permitted after default under UCC Article 9 | Court: Denial affirmed—conflicting evidence (loan/default) presented factual issue for jury |
| Whether quiet-title counterclaim could proceed after sale of the car | Sallaz: counterclaim should not be dismissed; relief still possible | Rices: claim is moot because they sold the Cadillac and have no practical need for quiet-title relief | Court: Quiet-title claim is moot—no further relief possible after sale and jury verdict favoring Rices |
| Whether defendants entitled to appellate attorney fees | Sallaz: appeal argued on merits (no separate statutory fee request contested) | Rices: appeal was frivolous and fees recoverable under Idaho Code § 12-121 | Court: Fees awarded—appeal pursued frivolously; citing requirement to identify statutory basis and finding § 12-121 applicable |
| Whether demand was required before repossession under UCC or common law | Sallaz: demand was required before repossession; absence invalidates repossession | Rices: no demand required where loan was payable immediately/default existed; UCC permits repossession after default without demand | Court: No demand required when no repayment time agreed; loan payable immediately/default existed and repossession permissible without prior demand |
Key Cases Cited
- Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr., Inc., 136 Idaho 887 (2002) (standard of review for directed verdicts and substantial-evidence test)
- Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010) (elements of conversion claim)
- Zaring v. Lavatta, 36 Idaho 459 (1922) (where no time for payment specified, debt is payable immediately)
- Mahas v. Kasiska, 47 Idaho 179 (1928) (note payable on demand is due immediately; statute of limitations runs from execution)
- Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762 (1970) (statute of limitations does not extinguish underlying debt)
- East Shoshone Hosp. Dist. v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937 (1985) (standard for awarding fees on appeal where appeal is frivolous)