968 N.W.2d 9
Mich. Ct. App.2021Background
- Houston family owned Lot 4 since 1952; a narrow ~120 sq ft strip south of a retaining wall (with garden, trees, shrubs) lay between the wall and the surveyed lot line and was maintained by Houston's predecessors and Houston.
- Lot 1 (north of Lot 4) was owned by Eugene and Virginia Proctor from 1968; title later passed through several parties and eventually to defendants (MGL and Wielhouwer) by 2016.
- Houston sued in 2019 to quiet title to the strip, alleging adverse possession and acquiescence based on continuous maintenance since the 1950s/1960s.
- Virginia Proctor submitted an affidavit stating she treated the retaining wall as the boundary for 33 years, knew the Houstons maintained the garden on the south side, and did not object.
- Defendants moved for summary disposition arguing Houston could not prove hostility (possession was permissive) and that intervening land contracts and later owners interrupt the 15-year statutory period.
- The trial court granted Houston summary disposition on adverse possession (finding hostility and a continuous 1968–1983 accrual), declined to rule on acquiescence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to adverse possession and held acquiescence independently supported title in Houston.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adverse possession — hostility and 15‑year accrual | Houstons and predecessors openly, exclusively, continuously maintained the strip up to the retaining wall; possession was hostile because they held to a visible boundary (the wall) and owners did not object | No evidence of hostility; use was permissive or at least not shown to be adverse; lacking proof the Houstons intended to hold to the wall as a boundary | Court found hostility satisfied: long, exclusive maintenance up to a visible, preexisting monument (Proctor affidavit uncontroverted) established intent to hold to the wall; 15‑year period accrued by 1968–1983 and adverse possession granted |
| Effect of land contracts on continuity/tacking | Successive periods can be tacked; vendor retains legal title during land contract so the Proctors’ ownership (and acquiescence) was continuous | Periods when vendees held under land contracts interrupt continuity; equitable ownership creates new accrual periods and defeats tacking | Court held legal title remained with vendors under land contracts and the Proctors’ continuous treatment of the wall (per affidavit) was not interrupted; defendants failed to produce contrary documentary evidence |
| Acquiescence — 15‑year boundary acquiescence | Proctors and Houstons tacitly treated the retaining wall as the boundary for >15 years (1968 onward); predecessors’ conduct may be tacked | Defendants point to ownership changes, later owners (2001–2016) and defendant knowledge of true surveyed line as breaking continuity; claim of permission by later owners | Court held acquiescence established as matter of law: uncontroverted Proctor affidavit plus maintained garden demonstrated tacit agreement to treat the wall as the boundary for the statutory period; acquiescence independently supports title transfer |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffner v. Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450 (trial‑court and appellate standard for summary disposition and equitable review)
- Kipka v. Fountain, 198 Mich App 435 (statutory 15‑year adverse possession framework)
- DeGroot v. Barber, 198 Mich App 48 (hostility: intent to hold to a visible, recognizable boundary can satisfy the element)
- Gorte v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 Mich App 161 (clarifying hostility when possessor holds to a recognizable boundary even if they believe it is the true line)
- Killips v. Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256 (tacking successive periods for adverse possession)
- Walters v. Snyder, 239 Mich App 453 (doctrine of acquiescence explained)
- Siegel v. Estate of Renkiewicz, 373 Mich 421 (tacking for acquiescence without privity)
- Zurcher v. Herveat, 238 Mich App 267 (legal title retained by vendor during land contract; equitable title distinctions)
- Daley v. Gruber, 361 Mich 358 (intent to possess may be established by conduct and circumstantial evidence)