21 F. Supp. 3d 154
D. Conn.2014Background
- DeMoss is a white male homosexual former Norwalk teacher who sued WRMS Principal Moore, Superintendent Corda, and the Norwalk Board of Education in an eighteen-count amended complaint.
- Allegations include First Amendment retaliation (counts 1-5) and various equal protection, Title VII, and CFEPA claims (counts 6-16, 18).
- Plaintiff alleges Moore and Corda discriminated against him and terminated him in retaliation for opposing racially discriminatory admissions and for complaints about sexual orientation discrimination.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 arguing lack of protected-class discrimination (and other defenses).
- The court granted in part and denied in part, dismissing most federal claims while allowing two state-law claims to proceed and declining to exercise jurisdiction over others based on supplemental jurisdiction analysis.
- Key factual backdrop includes May 2002 evaluation noting absences, the September 2002 “pink” remark incident, CPEP race-admission discussions, the June 2003 relocation of DeMoss from his classroom, numerous internal memoranda/letters, and an August 2003 termination decision finalized by October 7, 2003.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DeMoss’s Equal Protection claims survive | DeMoss asserts disparate treatment based on race. | Defendants contend no similarly situated comparators; retaliation rhetoric not in equal protection. | Granted; equal protection claims dismissed. |
| Whether DeMoss’s Title VII race-discrimination and related claims survive | Opposition to racially discriminatory policy was protected activity. | Title VII does not cover such student-discrimination opposition. | Granted; Counts Eleven, Twelve, Sixteen dismissed. |
| Whether DeMoss’s CFEPA sexual orientation claims survive | Discriminatory treatment and retaliatory actions based on sexual orientation were proven. | Non-discriminatory reasons supported termination; no pretext shown for some counts. | Count Fourteen denied (discriminatory treatment); Count Fifteen denied as to retaliation for orientation complaints. |
| Whether Count Eighteen under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51m survives | Statutory protection for reporting violations. | Claim abandoned by plaintiff. | Granted; Count Eighteen dismissed as abandoned. |
| Whether the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims | N/A | N/A | Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden on movant to show no genuine issue of material fact)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine dispute requires jury to resolve conflicting evidence)
- Kwan v. Andalex Group, LLC, 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013) (knowledge/prima facie causation in retaliation; but-for standard under Nassar considerations)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (but-for causation standard for retaliation)
- Bd. of Educ. of the City of Norwalk v. Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492 (Conn. 2003) (state-federal cross-guide in discrimination claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (framework for proving/disproving discriminatory treatment)