Demetrus Tremaine Horton v. State
01-14-00993-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 23, 2015Background
- Horton was stopped for a traffic violation; officer Meola smelled a strong odor of PCP coming from Horton's vehicle and from Horton himself.
- Meola had prior experience encountering PCP odor, described it as a strong chemical/"embalming fluid" smell.
- After patting down Horton’s waist/upper body (no contraband found) Meola observed a noticeable bulge in Horton’s left sock, handcuffed him for officer safety, reached into the sock, and pulled out three PCP‑dipped cigarettes in a plastic bag.
- The cigarettes were initially admitted without objection; the trial court then held a suppression hearing outside the jury and denied Horton’s motion to suppress.
- Horton testified at trial admitting he purchased and possessed the PCP cigarettes; he was convicted and sentenced (25 years) after pleading true to prior convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Horton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was the warrantless search of Horton’s person (sock) lawful? | Odor of PCP from the car and defendant gave probable cause to search person; exigent circumstances (risk of destruction, wet cigarettes, safety) justified immediate search. | Officer conducted an unlawful seizure/search of Horton’s sock without a warrant; pat‑down did not justify reaching into sock. | Court upheld denial of suppression: probable cause from odor + exigency supported the warrantless search. |
| 2. If search was unlawful, was admission of the cigarettes harmless? | Even if erroneously admitted, Horton’s own trial testimony admitting possession rendered any error harmless. | Admission was prejudicial because evidence was obtained unlawfully. | Held harmless: Horton’s testimony admitted possession, so any error was harmless. |
| 3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to litigate search‑and‑seizure law? | Counsel filed and argued a suppression motion and obtained a hearing; record does not establish deficient performance or prejudice. | Counsel unfamiliar with search‑and‑seizure law and failed to raise correct arguments, which prejudiced Horton. | Held no ineffective assistance: record does not show performance below objective standard or prejudice. |
| 4. Are inapposite precedents (residence or compelled medical intrusion) controlling? | Those residence/blood‑draw cases are distinguishable; confined space/vehicle odor rules and exigency cases control here. | Horton relied on cases restricting warrantless intrusions and bodily integrity rulings. | Held distinguishable: vehicle/odor/exigency authorities govern; bodily‑integrity cases (e.g., compelled blood draws) are not on point. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S.) (warrant requirement and exigent‑circumstances framework)
- United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (U.S.) (search‑incident‑to‑arrest doctrine principles)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S.) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App.) (harmless‑error principles when defendant testifies)
- Jordan v. State, 394 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]) (odor of narcotics in vehicle can supply probable cause to search occupants)
- Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App.) (probable cause + impracticability of obtaining warrant justify warrantless search)
- Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. Crim. App.) (general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable absent recognized exception)