Demetric McGowan v. Sherry Burt
788 F.3d 510
6th Cir.2015Background
- McGowan was tried in Michigan state court on cocaine and firearm charges; jury convicted on all counts and he received an aggregate sentence with a 195‑to‑480 month term on the cocaine count.
- Before trial the prosecutor offered a plea: guilty to cocaine and felony‑firearm as a second‑offense habitual offender with a recommended 5‑year (60‑month) sentence on the cocaine count plus a mandatory consecutive 24 months.
- Defense counsel erroneously estimated the applicable guidelines (pretrial) as 45–93 months; the actual post‑PSI guidelines were 78–195 months.
- McGowan rejected the plea and proceeded to trial; after conviction he moved for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance during plea bargaining (faulty guidelines estimate) caused him to reject the offer.
- Michigan trial court and Court of Appeals denied relief, finding counsel’s performance not constitutionally deficient and that McGowan’s testimony that he would have accepted the plea was self‑serving and not credible.
- The federal district court granted conditional habeas relief; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the state courts’ Strickland analysis was reasonable and entitled to AEDPA deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McGowan) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s inaccurate pretrial guidelines estimate constituted constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland | Counsel’s erroneous estimate of guidelines (45–93 mo.) caused McGowan to reject a better plea; error was deficient | Trial judge and Michigan Ct. of Appeals found counsel’s performance not deficient because both counsel and judge warned estimate might be inaccurate | State court ruling that performance was not constitutionally deficient was reasonable; no habeas relief under AEDPA |
| Whether McGowan established Strickland prejudice from counsel’s error (i.e., likely would have accepted plea, prosecution wouldn’t withdraw, court would accept terms, and sentence would be less) | Would have accepted plea but for erroneous estimate; thus suffered prejudice because trial sentence was harsher than plea would have been | McGowan’s post‑hoc testimony is self‑serving and contradicted by on‑the‑record statements and judge’s likely refusal to honor below‑guidelines 60‑month term | Prejudice not shown: state court reasonably rejected credibility, and trial judge likely would not have imposed the 60‑month term or might have allowed plea withdrawal |
| Proper standard of federal habeas review when state courts adjudicated ineffective‑assistance plea claims | District court should find constitutional error where counsel’s mistake led to rejection of plea | Federal courts must apply AEDPA deference and doubly deferential Strickland review per Supreme Court precedent | AEDPA requires doubly deferential review; district court erred by effectively conducting de novo review |
| Whether Lafler or Titlow controls outcome | Lafler shows longer sentence can be Strickland prejudice if counsel’s deficient advice caused rejection of plea | Titlow emphasizes deference to reasonable state‑court factfinding; outcome depends on reasonableness of state court’s Strickland application | Titlow governs here: state court reasonably applied Strickland, so habeas relief unavailable |
Key Cases Cited
- Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013) (AEDPA deference and doubly deferential review of plea‑stage ineffective assistance; affirmed reasonable state‑court factfinding)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (Strickland applies to plea bargaining; specifies elements of prejudice when ineffective advice causes rejection of a plea)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Strickland prejudice framework applied to guilty pleas)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits on review of state‑court adjudications under AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (highly deferential standard for federal habeas relief; state‑court rulings must be unreasonable beyond fairminded disagreement)
- Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (recognition that plea bargaining is critical stage triggering Strickland protections)