Demarco Nichols v. Illinois Department of Transp
19-1456
7th Cir.Jul 6, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Demarco Nichols prevailed in a Title VII employment-discrimination suit; judgment included $300,000 (statutory cap) plus equitable relief.
- Attorney Joseph Longo petitioned for $1,709,345 in attorneys’ fees (3,107.9 hours at $550/hr) and $4,460.47 in costs.
- IDOT objected, proposing a much smaller fee award and arguing Longo’s hours and rate were inflated and some conduct was unreasonable.
- The district court calculated a lodestar using $360/hour for attorney time and $125/hour for paralegal time, disallowed 962.1 hours (including travel, paralegal billed as attorney, clerical work, and a 20% across-the-board cut), and set the lodestar at $774,584.50; costs awarded were $4,061.02.
- The district court denied Longo’s request for a 15% upward adjustment and denied fees for litigating the fee petition itself.
- Longo appealed; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the district court applied the correct framework and did not abuse its discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal framework for fee awards | District court used wrong methodology | District court used lodestar + adjustments as required | Court applied correct lodestar framework; no legal error |
| Reasonable hourly rate | $550/hr is market rate supported by affidavits | Affidavits were conclusory/insufficient; prior awards support lower rate | $360/hr reasonable; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Travel and hours billed (including paralegal/clerical billing) | Travel and hours were compensable as billed | Many entries were excessive, unnecessary, or clerical; some travel was unnecessary | Court properly reduced hours (specified cuts) and denied unreasonable travel/time entries |
| Upward adjustment and fees for fee-stage litigation | 15% upward adjustment warranted for risk, success, deterrence; fees for litigating fee petition should be awarded | Lodestar sufficient; fee-stage was overbilled and lacked billing judgment | Denied upward adjustment (not exceptional) and denied fees for fee-stage litigation; district court within discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017) (describes lodestar framework and appellate deference)
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (lodestar presumptively sufficient; upward enhancements rare)
- Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984) (travel time may be billed if reasonable; unnecessary travel excluded)
- Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (fees for fee-stage are separately considered)
- Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard for fee awards)
- Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001) (district court may discredit conclusory affidavits on rates)
- Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986) (approves lump-sum reductions where line-by-line review is impractical)
- Jeffboat, LLC v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 553 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2009) (prior fee awards are useful benchmarks for market rate)
- Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011) (illustrates lodestar adjustments and analysis)