197 So. 3d 74
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Sharon King obtained a default judgment against DLC (Deluca Ladd & Carroll). The DeLuca and Ladd parties were not defendants in that original action.
- King filed a motion for proceedings supplementary under section 56.29 and sought to implead the DeLuca and Ladd parties; the trial court entered an order directing service “in accordance with Fla. Stat. § 56.29(3)” and ordered them to show cause.
- King served the order to show cause by U.S. mail on the DeLuca and Ladd parties; they did not appear at the hearing, and the court entered a supplemental final judgment against them.
- The DeLuca and Ladd parties moved to vacate under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b), asserting the judgment was void because they were not personally served.
- The trial court denied relief, concluding service by mail complied with section 56.29(3); the court relied on Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings.
- The appellate court held mailing was not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over impleaded parties, reversed the denial of the 1.540(b) motion, and remanded with instructions to vacate the supplemental final judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mailing the order to show cause satisfied service to confer personal jurisdiction over impleaded parties in proceedings supplementary | King: Section 56.29(3) authorizes service by mail on parties to be impleaded | DeLuca/Ladd: They were not personally or properly served; mailing is insufficient | Mailing was insufficient; personal service required to implead and exercise jurisdiction |
| Whether a judgment entered without proper service is void and subject to 1.540(b) relief | King: Proper service occurred under statute so judgment valid | DeLuca/Ladd: Judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction | Judgment is void for lack of service; trial court must vacate under 1.540(b) |
| Whether section 56.29(3) eliminates ordinary service requirements for third‑party impleaders | King: Statute permits service of the order by mail on impleaded parties | DeLuca/Ladd: Statute does not eliminate requirement of service of summons for those not yet in court | Section 56.29(3) does not authorize mail service for parties not yet impleaded; summons-style personal service required |
| Whether Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings supports mailing as sufficient service | King: Trial court relied on Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings to permit mailing | DeLuca/Ladd: That case did not address manner of service; facts showed personal service there | Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings is inapposite; it dealt with what must be served, not how service must be made |
Key Cases Cited
- Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Estate of Jackson ex rel. Jackson‑Platts, 110 So.3d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (discussed whether separate impleader complaint required in proceedings supplementary)
- Biel Reo, LLC v. Barefoot Cottages Dev. Co., 156 So.3d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining proceedings supplementary are equitable and collateral; affidavit/notice requirements)
- Varveris v. Alberto M. Carbonell, P.A., 773 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing judgment against impleaded defendant for lack of personal or substituted service)
- Borden v. East‑European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2006) (service of process is means to notify a party and enable court jurisdiction)
- Jarboe Family & Friends Irrevocable Living Trust v. Spielman, 136 So.3d 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (trial court must have personal jurisdiction over impleaded defendants)
- Wiggins v. Tigrent, Inc., 147 So.3d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (standard of review for whether judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo)
- Linn‑Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 710 So.2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (judgment entered without service of process is void)
- Kathleen G. Kozinski, P.A. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same: judgment without service is void)