DeLuca's Market Corp. v. SuperValu, Inc.
752 F.3d 728
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- D & G, a small family-owned grocery in Mount Vernon, Iowa, sues two large wholesalers, Super-Valu and C&S, under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act after a 2003 asset exchange concentrated Midwest wholesale market.
- The exchange shifted Fleming’s assets to C&S and Super-Valu’s New England assets to Super-Valu, with reciprocal non-compete provisions restricting competition across regions.
- Post-transaction, Super-Valu’s Midwest market share rose from 40% to 65%, sharply increasing regional market concentration.
- D & G contends ABS-based pricing by Super-Valu raised prices in the Midwest, and that the non-compete arrangement created a per se antitrust violation or a rule-of-reason violation depending on factual terms.
- District court denied class certification for a Midwest class, granted partial summary judgment (noting limitations on per se analysis), and later denied D & G’s renewed targeted motion; the case was remanded for further proceedings.
- On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reviews summary judgment de novo and addresses whether the agreement’s terms, market definition, injury, and class certification support reversal or remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the non-compete is a per se violation or requires rule-of-reason analysis | D&G argues per se division of markets. | Wholesalers contend rule-of-reason or other analysis. | Material factual dispute on terms prevents per se summary judgment. |
| Whether there is a genuine dispute about the relevant market and injury | D&G asserts a defined competitive market and antitrust injury. | Wholesalers dispute the market definition and injury evidence. | Summary judgment improper; market/injury questions remain for trial. |
| Whether the district court properly denied class certification for Midwest customers | D&G seeks class treatment for all Midwest ABS customers. | Wholesalers argue lack of common proof of damages across class. | Affirmed denial for broad Midwest class; vacated denial for Champaign-only class and remanded to consider narrower class. |
| Whether the claim is time-barred by statute of limitations | Klehr continuing-violation theory tolls limitations for some acts outside the period. | No tolling beyond four-year Clayton Act window. | Klehr permits recovery for inflated prices within four years prior to complaint; § 15b not preclusive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994) (customer allocation schemes can be per se violations)
- Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (agreements to divide markets are per se illegal)
- United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market allocation among competitors typically per se illegal)
- Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417 (8th Cir. 2009) (customer allocation agreements are typically per se violations)
- Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) (continuing-violation theory; overt acts start statute anew)
- HDC Med., Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2007) (reaffirms product-market as a question of fact for antitrust injury)
- Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Associated Elec. Co.-op, Inc., 838 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment standard in antitrust context)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary-judgment burden in antitrust cases)
- Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion standard for class-certification decisions)