Delois Banister v. U.S. Bank National Association
21-1031
| 7th Cir. | Sep 21, 2021Background
- In July 2015, an Illinois state court entered a judgment foreclosing Delois Banister’s mortgage and her house was sold in a sheriff’s sale.
- Banister filed five federal suits challenging the foreclosure and defendants’ conduct; several prior federal cases were dismissed (or voluntarily dismissed) and judges warned Rooker–Feldman barred her claims.
- In this, her fifth federal complaint, Banister alleged bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, sought $20 million, and asked the court to set aside the state foreclosure judgment and sheriff’s sale.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and referred Banister to the court’s Executive Committee for possible restricted-filer status.
- Banister appealed, generally claiming unfairness and bias but failing to meaningfully contest the Rooker–Feldman ground.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, held the referral non-appealable here, noted several other pleading defects, and ordered Banister to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for a frivolous appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court has jurisdiction or Rooker–Feldman bars the action | Banister sought to vacate the state foreclosure and obtain damages for alleged bank fraud | Defendants argued the complaint attacks a state-court judgment, so Rooker–Feldman bars federal relief | Rooker–Feldman applies: federal court lacks jurisdiction because granting relief would require invalidating the state judgment |
| Whether damages under a criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1344) can support federal relief | Banister invoked § 1344 to seek civil damages | Defendants argued § 1344 is a criminal statute and cannot supply a civil cause of action that would bypass Rooker–Feldman | Court held § 1344 cannot furnish a civil claim here; damages would necessarily invalidate the state judgment and are barred |
| Whether the referral to the district court Executive Committee is appealable | Banister contested the referral as unfair | Defendants implicitly argued the referral is not an appealable order here | Court held the referral is not an appealable final order; Banister could have appealed the Executive Committee’s eventual restricted-filer order |
| Whether the appeal is frivolous and sanctions are warranted | Banister continued to press the appeal despite prior dismissals and warnings | Defendants sought costs/fees and argued the appeal is frivolous and repetitive | Court ordered Banister to show cause within 14 days why sanctions (appellees’ costs and fees) should not be imposed, given repetitive, frivolous litigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (establishes that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state-court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (limits lower federal courts from reviewing state bar admission and related state-court judgments)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (clarifies scope of Rooker–Feldman and distinguishes preclusion principles)
- Mains v. Citibank, 852 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (applies Rooker–Feldman to foreclosure-related federal claims)
- Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2018) (pro se appellants must engage the district court’s reasons on appeal)
- Georgakis v. Illinois State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2013) (duplicative, harassing suits warrant dismissal)
- Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2012) (issue preclusion bars relitigation of claims decided in earlier federal suits)
- In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2003) (procedural rules on appealing institutional filing restrictions)
