Dellew Corporation v. United States
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7651
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- The Army awarded a logistics support contract to Tech Systems, Inc.; Dellew protested in the Court of Federal Claims claiming procedural and cost-realism defects in the award.
- After briefing, the Court of Federal Claims made repeated, strong oral comments at argument indicating it likely would rule for Dellew and repeatedly suggested the Army take corrective action; the court postponed issuing a written decision pending a joint status report.
- The Army amended the solicitation, terminated the TSI contract, and the Government moved to dismiss Dellew’s protest as moot based on that corrective action.
- The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the protest as moot but later awarded Dellew $79,456.76 in EAJA attorney fees and costs, concluding the court’s oral comments carried sufficient "judicial imprimatur" to make Dellew a prevailing party.
- The Government appealed, arguing (1) the Army’s corrective action was voluntary because it occurred before any court ruling, and (2) bench comments lack the judicial imprimatur Buckhannon requires to confer prevailing-party status under the EAJA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dellew is a "prevailing party" under EAJA after agency corrective action | Dellew argued the court’s substantive oral comments and apparent intent to rule for Dellew materially altered the parties’ legal relationship, qualifying it as prevailing | Government argued the Army acted voluntarily before any ruling; bench comments lack binding judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon | Held for Government: Dellew is not a prevailing party under the EAJA |
| Whether agency corrective action was voluntary or court-ordered | Dellew contended the Army acted because the court made its position known, so action was not voluntary | Government maintained corrective action preceded any binding court order and thus was voluntary conduct by the agency | Held: corrective action was voluntary because no written/oral ruling or court order preceded it |
| Whether oral bench comments can supply the judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon | Dellew claimed the court’s explicit statements and draft opinion were equivalent to a ruling and carried sufficient imprimatur | Government relied on Buckhannon/Rice/Brickwood to argue non-binding comments lack the required imprimatur | Held: bench comments were insufficient; non-binding comments do not equate to court-ordered relief |
| Whether Court of Federal Claims misapplied precedent (Universal Fidelity vs. binding circuit/supreme precedent) | Dellew relied on Court of Federal Claims decisions like Universal Fidelity extending imprimatur to some pre-decision court actions | Government argued controlling Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent govern and preclude awarding fees here | Held: Court erred in relying on Universal Fidelity over binding Federal Circuit/Supreme Court precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (prevailing party requires judicially sanctioned change in legal relationship, not voluntary defendant action)
- Rice Servs., Ltd. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1017 (2005) (EAJA prevailing-party standard requires judicial imprimatur; agency action before court ruling is voluntary)
- Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371 (2002) (court’s oral comments on merits do not provide sufficient judicial imprimatur for EAJA relief)
- Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (2006) (Court of Federal Claims must follow Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent)
- Universal Fidelity LP v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 310 (2006) (Court of Federal Claims held a written preliminary order enjoining a solicitation conferred prevailing-party status; distinguished by this panel)