511 F.Supp.3d 55
D. Mass.2021Background
- Vincent Delaney (Peabody resident) sued Governor Charles Baker in his official capacity challenging Massachusetts COVID-19 emergency orders; multiple constitutional and state-law counts were filed but only the Free Exercise claim (Count II) remained for decision.
- Governor Baker issued successive pandemic orders setting gathering-size limits, phased reopening rules, sector-specific occupancy and safety standards (including 40–50% occupancy for houses of worship at times), mask mandates, and social-distancing requirements.
- The Archdiocese of Boston adopted its own, sometimes stricter, safety protocols (masking, temperature checks, ban on congregational singing, dispensation from obligation to attend Mass).
- Delaney alleged occupancy limits, social-distancing, and mask mandates (in-church and in public) violate his free-exercise rights; he sought preliminary relief which the court treated as a trial on the merits.
- The court took judicial notice of the severe COVID-19 outbreak in Massachusetts and found many of the pandemic measures have a public-health basis.
- The Court dismissed several claims for lack of standing or as non-justiciable, found Delaney lacked standing to challenge in-parish measures, but considered his challenge to the public mask mandate on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to challenge occupancy limits at Delaney's parish | Delaney contended occupancy caps risk future denial of entry and thus injure his free-exercise rights | Governor Baker argued injury is speculative and not traceable to the State because no actual denial occurred | No standing — injury not concrete, particularized, or certainly impending; speculative denial insufficient |
| Standing and redressability for in-parish mask & distancing rules | Masks and distancing imposed on parishioners infringe Delaney's sincere religious practice | Governor Baker argued Archdiocese-created protocols break the causal chain; relief against State would not redress parish policies | No standing — redressability fails because Archdiocese independently set and could keep protocols absent State orders |
| Standing to challenge mask mandate in public places | Delaney argued public mask order burdens his religious beliefs and is directly traceable to State action | Governor Baker maintained the public mask order is a general public-health rule and Delaney has a concrete injury when subjected to it in public | Standing exists to challenge public mask mandate (direct-causation injury) |
| Merits of public mask mandate under Free Exercise: applicable standard and constitutionality | Delaney urged traditional Free Exercise scrutiny (and narrower tailoring) rather than Jacobson deference; argued mandates burden religious practice | Baker argued Jacobson provides deferential review in public-health emergencies; alternatively, masks are neutral and generally applicable and at most rationally related to public-health goals | Held for Baker: mask orders are neutral/general and rationally related to public-health interests; even under Jacobson they have a real/substantial relation to protecting public health and are not a "plain, palpable" invasion of rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (Article III standing requirements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1905) (deferential standard for health measures during epidemics — "real or substantial relation"; avoid "plain, palpable" constitutional invasions)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1993) (test for neutrality and general applicability in Free Exercise cases)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (U.S. 2020) (applied strict scrutiny where restrictions singled out houses of worship)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (concreteness requirement for standing)
- Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (future harm must be certainly impending for standing)
- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (U.S. 1990) (neutral, generally applicable laws subject only to rational-basis review for Free Exercise)
- Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2020) (discussing concreteness and particularity in standing analysis)
- Dantzler, Inc. v. Empresas Berríos Inventory & Operations, Inc., 958 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2020) (traceability and causation in standing where third-party actions factor into the chain)