Delacruz v. People, 2017 CO 21

Gerardo Delacruz was convicted of murder and related charges; convictions were reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial. The trial court received the appellate mandate on Nov. 27, 2009, triggering a six‑month speedy‑trial period under § 18‑1‑405(2).
Trial was set within that period for May 17, 2010. Four days before trial the prosecution learned (via witness Myra Sepulveda) of a possible conflict involving Delacruz’s defense counsel.
The prosecution notified the court and requested a hearing; the court found a continuance necessary to appoint independent counsel to investigate and allow Delacruz to make an informed waiver decision.
The court concluded the continuance was authorized under § 18‑1‑405(6)(g)(I) (material unavailable) and (II) (exceptional circumstances), extended the speedy‑trial deadline by six months, and rescheduled the trial.
After independent investigation the witness recanted and Delacruz waived any conflict; he later moved to dismiss for speedy‑trial violation, which the trial court and the court of appeals denied.
The Supreme Court affirmed: it held that subsection (6)’s exclusions apply to retrial deadlines under subsection (2) and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance to investigate the late‑disclosed potential conflict.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Delacruz)	Defendant's Argument (People)	Held
Do the time exclusions in § 18‑1‑405(6) apply to the six‑month retrial period triggered by subsection (2)?	Subsection (6) refers only to subsection (1), so its exclusions do not apply to subsection (2) retrials.	Subsection (1) creates the basic speedy‑trial right; subsection (2) merely sets the trigger for retrial — exclusions in (6) therefore apply to retrials.	The exclusions in (6) apply to the retrial period under (2).
Did the trial court err in granting a continuance to investigate a late‑disclosed potential conflict (thus extending the retrial deadline)?	The continuance was unnecessary because Delacruz could have waived conflict‑free counsel at the hearing without investigation; witness was not unavailable/material.	The late disclosure created exceptional circumstances and an ethical obligation to investigate; reasonable delay was required to protect Sixth Amendment rights.	No abuse of discretion; exceptional circumstances justified the continuance under § 18‑1‑405(6)(g)(II).

People v. Jamerson, 596 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1979) (historical interpretation of speedy‑trial provisions supports applying exclusions consistently)
People v. Runningbear, 753 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1988) (statute implements constitutional speedy‑trial right and prevents unnecessary delay)
People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1983) (dismissal required when statutory speedy‑trial period expires absent applicable exclusions)
People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871 (Colo. 2002) (prosecutor’s ethical obligation to investigate alleged conflicts once they become apparent)
People v. Martinez, 869 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1994) (valid waiver of conflict‑free counsel requires full, knowing, intelligent advice)
People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1997) (statutory speedy‑trial right may yield to protect other fundamental constitutional rights)