Dela Cruz v. Quemado, 364 P.3d 934

Background

Florencio and Anastacia (owners of a jewelry business) visited Irene Quemado’s home to show and have jewelry repaired; Irene invited her son Marvin to handle and try on pieces. Marvin had prior felony drug convictions; Irene knew of those convictions but did not disclose them.
Marvin handled jewelry at Irene’s house, asked prices, requested a necklace, then left. About one to two hours later, in a restaurant parking lot, Marvin and co-defendant Brian Higa (with Higa committing the armed robbery) robbed Florencio, seizing an aluminum jewelry case.
Marvin and Higa were later criminally prosecuted, pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and related counts, and a federal judgment awarded restitution to Florencio and Anastacia.
Appellants sued Irene, Marvin, and Higa in state court. Defaults were entered against Marvin and Higa (2009) and against Irene (2013) for certain HRCP settlement-conference failures; Appellants moved for default judgment against Irene and a liability hearing was held.
The circuit court denied the motion for default judgment, concluding Irene’s knowledge of Marvin’s drug convictions did not make it reasonably foreseeable he would commit an armed robbery, and that Irene’s invitation did not create the circumstances that afforded the robbery opportunity. Appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied and final judgment entered; appellants appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether default judgment should be entered against Irene	Evidence at liability hearing sufficed to overcome directed verdict and support default judgment	Court properly required proof; evidence insufficient to establish Irene’s liability	Denied: evidence at hearing was insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability on Irene
Whether Marvin’s prior drug convictions made his later armed robbery reasonably foreseeable to Irene	Marvin’s drug use/crimes were directly related and made robbery foreseeable if opportunity arose	Drug convictions are materially different from violent crimes; foresight of robbery not established	Not foreseeable as a matter of law; Irene owed no duty based on those convictions
Whether Irene’s affirmative conduct (inviting Marvin to handle jewelry) created the risk or circumstances enabling the robbery	Irene’s invitation and allowing Marvin to handle jewelry proximately created opportunity and risk	Invitation did not cause or materially increase foreseeable risk; robbery occurred off premises later — no causation or facilitation	No: court found her acts did not create a recognizable high degree of risk or the circumstances that afforded the robbery
Whether Irene participated, facilitated, or assisted planning/commission of the robbery	Implied assistance from her conduct and failure to warn about Marvin	No evidence of participation, facilitation, or assistance in planning the crime	No substantial evidence of participation or facilitation; liability limited to Marvin and Higa

Key Cases Cited

Hupp v. Accessory Distribs., Inc., 1 Haw. App. 174, 616 P.2d 233 (app. 1980) (standard for reviewing denial of default judgment/liability hearing evidence)
Nelson v. Univ. of Hawai'i, [citation="97 Hawai'i 376, 38 P.3d 95"] (Haw. 2001) (directed verdict/JNOV rulings reviewed de novo; substantial evidence standard)
Touchette v. Ganal, [citation="82 Hawai'i 293, 922 P.2d 347"] (Haw. 1996) (duty arises where defendant’s affirmative conduct creates or worsens foreseeable risk from a third party; Restatement §§ 302–302B framework)
Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal.Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (spouse liable where she knew of husband’s prior molestations and invited minors into circumstances enabling harm)
Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel., [citation="112 Hawai'i 3, 143 P.3d 1205"] (Haw. 2006) (foreseeability as a question of law for duty determinations)
Bhakta v. Cnty. of Maui, [citation="109 Hawai'i 198, 124 P.3d 943"] (Haw. 2005) (appellate review of conclusions of law is de novo)