Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp.
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9900
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- Del Marcelle alleged Brown County police failed to protect him from harassment by a motorcycle gang, leading to housing displacement.
- Glenmore and surrounding jurisdictions had discretionary policing; Del Marcelle filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 equal protection claim, pro se.
- District court dismissed for failure to state a claim, citing DeShaney and Hilton as limiting police-protection duties.
- En banc review produced a three-way division; five judges favored affirming the dismissal, four favored a different standard, and five dissented.
- Court declined a unified precedent, but discussed a proposed simple standard requiring intentional discrimination by state actors with no public-duty justification.
- The opinion clarifies a split on whether class-of-one claims can reach police discretion and the role of animus in such claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governing standard for class-of-one by frontline officers | Del Marcelle seeks a simple rational-basis-plus-intent approach. | Defendants favor Engquist-based limit excluding class-of-one claims in discretionary policing. | No single majority standard; the court affirms dismissal without a uniform standard. |
| Role of animus in class-of-one claims | Plaintiff can plead personal animus as a plausible discriminatory motive. | Discretionary policing requires no motive showing for liability. | Animus is not always required, but a plausible reason for intentional discrimination must be pled. |
| Standing to challenge police inaction | Del Marcelle seeks equal protection relief for personal injury from inaction. | No right to compel police action; relief must be grounded in equal protection. | Standing recognized for equal-protection injury, but the claimed theory fails on the pleaded standard. |
| Class-of-one liability against police discretion | Discretionary police decisions can violate equal protection under a class-of-one theory. | Engquist bars class-of-one claims in discretionary policing contexts. | Class-of-one liability to police discretion is disfavored; dismissal affirmed under the court’s divided stance. |
| Pleading standard for class-of-one in policing | Plaintiff should plead specific discriminatory actions and lack of rational basis. | Pleading need not detail every comparator; discretion makes exact proof difficult. | Rule requires plausible allegations of intentional discrimination, lack of rational basis, and injury. |
Key Cases Cited
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one claims require plausible evidence of intentional discrimination and irrationality when no clear standard exists)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits class-of-one claims against public-employer decisions; discretion matters in policing)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no substantive due process right to police protection against private harm)
- Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (no entitlement to police protection or enforcement of restraining orders under due process)
- Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (no standing to compel prosecution or nonprosecution in criminal statutes)
- Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (1998) ( Seventh Circuit antecedent recognizing class-of-one concept with a clear standard for comparing similarly situated)