DeJoseph v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 595

Plaintiff DeJoseph sued Continental/United in New Jersey state court for injuries from hot liquid spilled on an international flight, asserting state-law tort claims including negligence, willful conduct, strict liability, and requests for compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants removed to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction and, alternatively, federal-question jurisdiction via complete preemption by the Montreal Convention; removal occurred after service in December 2013.
Magistrate Judge Hammer recommended denying remand based on apparent diversity jurisdiction (amount in controversy inferred to exceed $75,000 from punitive damages and attorney-fee claims).
After the R&R, DeJoseph filed a timely objection stipulating he will not seek damages above $75,000, thus defeating diversity jurisdiction.
The district court then considered the remaining question whether federal-question jurisdiction exists because the Montreal Convention completely preempts state-law claims arising from international air carriage.
The court held that Article 29 of the Montreal Convention does not clearly effect complete preemption; instead its limits operate as an affirmative defense, so federal-question removal was not proper and the case was remanded to state court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether diversity jurisdiction exists	DeJoseph stipulates damages ≤ $75,000 so no diversity jurisdiction	Defendants earlier argued amount in controversy exceeded $75,000	Held: No diversity jurisdiction (stipulation treated as binding)
Whether Montreal Convention completely preempts state-law claims permitting federal-question removal	DeJoseph: claims are state-law and not completely preempted; removal improper	Defendants: Article 29 completely preempts and converts claims into federal ones (removal proper)	Held: Article 29 does not clearly create complete preemption; preemption is an affirmative defense, so removal under §1441 improper
Proper construction of removal statutes when treaty preemption asserted	Favor strict construction of removal and resolve doubts in favor of remand	Defendants urge courts to apply Warsaw/Montreal precedent finding complete preemption in some circuits	Held: Narrow construction required; Supreme Court precedent (Tseng) does not mandate complete preemption here
Treatment of post-R&R evidence (stipulation) in remand analysis	Plaintiff: stipulation clarifies complaint and is binding	Defendants: (implicitly) R&R relied on face of complaint showing amount in controversy	Held: Court may consider plaintiff’s binding stipulation as clarification; it defeats diversity jurisdiction

U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383 (3d Cir.) (removal requires district court to have original jurisdiction)
Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.) (party asserting jurisdiction bears burden at all stages)
Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.) (removal statute strictly construed; doubts resolved in favor of remand)
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (U.S.) (complete preemption doctrine example)
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (U.S.) (complete preemption converts state claims into federal ones)
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (U.S.) (Warsaw Convention preemption: plaintiff cannot recover under state law when claim fails to meet Convention conditions)
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (U.S.) (federal preemption is ordinarily a defense)
Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.) (removal doubt rule and jurisdictional burden)