Decuir v. United States, 285 A.3d 512

Background

June 2015: Malek Mercer was shot after exiting a bus; Derryck Decuir was identified from bus footage and arrested. Mercer died days later.
Decuir was tried three times: first trial (guilty of obstruction, evidence tampering, felon-in-possession, carrying pistol without license; acquitted on first-degree murder and attempted robbery; mistrial on second-degree murder/PFCV); second trial (mistrial on second-degree murder/PFCV); third trial (retrial of second-degree murder and related PFCV).
At the third trial the government advanced a different theory (Decuir shot Mercer to rebuff a perceived sexual advance after Anthony Ryans asked, “why you looking at that boy’s butt?”). The government sought to admit Ryans’s testimony from the second trial as Ryans was claimed to be unavailable.
The trial court admitted Ryans’s prior testimony; the jury convicted Decuir of second-degree murder and the related PFCV charge; Decuir received concurrent lengthy terms.
On appeal the court held the trial court abused its discretion in finding Ryans unavailable and erred by admitting his prior testimony (Confrontation Clause), reversed and remanded the second-degree murder and PFCV convictions; it affirmed Decuir’s obstruction and other convictions and sustained the court’s decision to proceed to sentencing after the second trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Anthony Ryans’s prior testimony (Confrontation Clause / unavailability)	Gov’t: Ryans was unavailable despite efforts; prior trial testimony admissible.	Decuir: Gov’t did not make reasonable, diligent efforts to locate Ryans; live testimony required.	Trial court abused discretion; Ryans not shown unavailable by sufficiently vigorous search; admission violated Confrontation Clause; conviction for murder and PFCV reversed and remanded.
Harmless-error standard for admitted testimony	Gov’t: Even if error, admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.	Decuir: Ryans’s testimony was critical; error likely contributed to conviction.	Error was not harmless; reasonable possibility it contributed to conviction; reversal required.
Obstruction of justice conviction under D.C. Code § 22-722(a)(6) (does statute cover concealment of physical evidence via third parties?)	Gov’t: Decuir’s coded jail calls directing others to hide firearms corruptly impeded investigation and fall within the statute.	Decuir: Statute does not apply to mere concealment of physical evidence.	Conviction affirmed: Decuir corruptly influenced others to hide evidence with intent to undermine investigation; statute covers such conduct.
Sentencing prior to retrial / allocution and Fifth Amendment concerns	Gov’t: Interests of justice warranted sentencing on earlier convictions before the pending retrial.	Decuir: Proceeding forced a choice between allocuting and invoking Fifth Amendment; deprived meaningful allocution.	No abuse of discretion: court properly offered allocution; declining to speak to avoid self-incrimination is defendant’s choice and does not violate allocution rights.

Key Cases Cited

Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873 (D.C. 2012) (prior testimony admissible only if witness unavailable after reasonable, good-faith efforts and defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine)
Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557 (D.C. 2005) (appellate review of unavailability determination is for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (government must search as vigorously as it would absent prior testimony)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (prosecution must show nonconstitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (good-faith efforts to secure witness relevant to admissibility of prior statements; later abrogated on other grounds but cited for pre-Crawford confrontation analysis)
Smith v. United States, 68 A.3d 729 (D.C. 2013) (definition of "corruptly" as intent to undermine integrity of a pending investigation)
Warrick v. United States, 551 A.2d 1332 (D.C. 1988) (defendant’s right to allocution at sentencing)