Deckard v. Bunch
358 Or. 754
| Or. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Deckard was seriously injured in a head-on collision caused by Bunch, who had been drinking at King’s home; Deckard sued both Bunch and King’s estate.
- Against King, Deckard pleaded common-law negligence (alleging King served a visibly intoxicated guest who then drove) and a statutory-liability claim under ORS 471.565(2).
- The trial court dismissed the statutory-liability claim for failure to state a claim (ORCP 21 A(8)); the case proceeded to trial on common-law negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for defendant.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding ORS 471.565(2) creates an independent statutory cause of action for serving a visibly intoxicated person who later injures third parties.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether ORS 471.565(2) creates an independent statutory right of action or instead operates to limit/shape common-law negligence claims involving overservice of alcohol.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 471.565(2) creates an independent statutory cause of action against a social host who serves a visibly intoxicated guest who then injures a third party | Deckard: statute (text, context, legislative history) shows legislature intended to create statutory liability that does not require proving foreseeability | King: statute functions as a shield/limit on common-law liability (it does not create a separate statutory remedy) | Held: ORS 471.565(2) does not create an independent statutory cause of action; it limits/commonizes liability under common-law negligence |
| Whether the 1979 enactment (former ORS 30.950/30.955) and later amendments removed foreseeability or negligence elements for overservice claims | Deckard: legislative language and later amendments indicate preservation/creation of statutory claims and elimination of foreseeability requirement | King: legislative history shows 1979 bill was meant to approve Campbell’s common-law negligence standard (including knew-or-should-have-known), not to create negligence-per-se or strict statutory liability | Held: 1979 legislation ratified the Campbell common-law negligence standard (including foreseeability); subsequent amendments did not create a separate statutory tort |
| Whether prior Oregon cases justify reading a standalone statutory remedy into ORS 471.565 | Deckard relied on dicta and some holdings (e.g., Chartrand, Solberg, Grady) as supporting statutory remedy | King pointed to Sager, Gattman, Hawkins and legislative record showing intent to limit, not expand, liability | Held: prior cases read holistically and legislative record support limiting/codifying Campbell; court disavows Chartrand dictum suggesting enactment created independent statutory right |
| Whether dismissal of the statutory claim was harmless given jury instructions on common-law negligence | Deckard: Court of Appeals said error was not harmless | King: alternatively argued any dismissal error was harmless because jury received equivalent negligence instruction | Held: Supreme Court resolved substantive statutory issue and affirmed dismissal; did not reach harmless-error argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237 (adopted rule that serving a visibly intoxicated patron can give rise to common-law negligence for off-premises third‑party harm)
- Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or. 689 (discussed statutory liability theory; included dictum the court later disavows)
- Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33 (examined 1979 legislative history and concluded the statute limited tavern liability and codified Campbell)
- Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or. 11 (treated former ORS 30.950 as a limitation; declined to extend statutory liability to off‑premises assault)
- Hawkins v. Conklin, 307 Or. 262 (treated former ORS 30.950 as governing operation of common‑law negligence; limited recovery to conduct of serving a visibly intoxicated person)
- Grady v. Cedar Side Inn, Inc., 330 Or. 42 (recognized claims under former ORS 30.950 but did not define elements distinct from common‑law negligence)
- Stachniewicz v. Mar‑Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583 (refused to adopt ORS 471.410 as negligence‑per‑se standard for third‑party civil liability)
- Doyle v. City of Medford, 356 Or. 336 (explains framework for determining when statute implies a private right of action)
- Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or. 630 (explains nature of statutory liability and how to identify legislative intent)