Deck v. State, 2012 Mo. LEXIS 115

Movant Carman Deck was sentenced to death for 1996 murders of James and Zelma Long and pursued multiple post-conviction proceedings.
This Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief claim asserted ineffective penalty-phase representation and denial of relief at prior stages.
Movant alleged penalty-phase counsel failed to ask certain voir dire questions, failed to call additional mitigation witnesses, and failed to pursue neuropsychological testing, among other actions.
The motion court denied relief on all grounds, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the claims and a separate request for a new trial based on destroyed juror questionnaires.
The Court applied Strickland’s two-prong standard and treated trial strategies as presumptively reasonable, concluding no deficient performance or prejudice.
The case history includes Deck I–IV rulings and a U.S. Supreme Court remand due to shackling during the penalty phase, leading to another penalty-phase retrial before the current ruling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was penalty-phase voir dire ineffective for not probing bias against Movant?	Deck	Deck	No; questioning was proper and did not render counsel ineffective.
Did counsel’s failure to call additional mitigation witnesses amount to ineffective assistance?	Deck	Deck	No; witnesses would have been cumulative or inconsequential and did not create a viable defense.
Was there ineffective assistance for not pursuing neuropsychological testing?	Deck	Deck	No; no demonstrated brain impairment and testimony would not have changed the outcome.
Did failure to object to prosecutor’s cross-examination of Dr. Surratt amount to ineffective assistance?	Deck	Deck	No; trial strategy supported the decision, and prejudice was not shown.
Was movant entitled to a new trial due to destruction of juror questionnaires?	Deck	Deck	No; questionnaires showed no bias and the denial of relief was proper.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1992) (juror impartiality and exclusion of biased jurors in capital cases)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (U.S. 1978) (mitigating evidence must be considered)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1982) (requires consideration of mitigating evidence)
Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116 (Mo. banc 2005) (additional mitigating evidence must overcome aggravation to affect life verdict)
Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004) (defense failure to locate or present mitigating evidence analyzed for prejudice)
Banks v. State, 215 S.W.3d 118 (Mo. banc 2007) (prosecutorial argument; improper rhetoric analyzed for prejudice)
Storey v. State, 901 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. banc 1995) (prosecutorial arguments; objecting strategy reviewed for prejudice)
Tokar v. State, 918 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. banc 1996) (prosecutorial remarks; not always prejudicial)
Deck II, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. banc 2002) (post-conviction review of penalty-phase issues (prejudice standard))
Deck IV, 303 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. banc 2010) (reaffirmed standards for prejudice in prosecutorial remarks and mitigation)