1 F.4th 508
7th Cir.2021Background
- Eaton, an apprentice operating engineer and union member, was fired after one day on a telehandler job in March 2011; a union grievance led Findorff to promise to rehire her as a skip hoist operator.
- She was hired on the skip hoist in August 2011, worked through August 2012, and submitted apprenticeship training reports filled out by her superintendent, Szymkowski.
- In January 2012 Eaton filed an EEOC charge alleging her temporary rotating layoff was sex discrimination; the company was informed only that she had complained about the layoff, not that the complaint alleged sex discrimination.
- In 2017 Eaton applied for rehire but Findorff says no positions were open; receptionist Garni asked Szymkowski, who said he would not rehire or recommend Eaton.
- In April 2018 Local 139 attempted to dispatch Eaton for an operator job; Findorff declined by letter citing past performance, and Local 139 stopped referring her. Eaton filed a 2018 EEOC charge and sued for retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for Findorff.
Issues
| Issue | Eaton's Argument | Findorff's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 failure-to-hire: was there an adverse action? | Garni’s inquiry and Szymkowski’s comment prevented consideration and thus was adverse. | No open operator positions existed in 2017; Eaton cites only hearsay about an opening. | Not adverse: no open position evidence; hearsay (Rupert) inadmissible, so claim fails. |
| 2018 refusal-to-hire: was it retaliation causally connected to the 2012 EEOC charge? | The company’s prior response to her 2012 complaint implies decision-makers knew and retaliated. | Decision-makers (Szymkowski, Schneider) did not know the 2012 complaint alleged sex discrimination; therefore no but-for causation. | No genuine issue on causation; Eaton produced no evidence decision-makers had actual knowledge of protected activity. |
| Evidentiary point at summary judgment: may Eaton rely on coworker hearsay to show an opening? | Relies on testimony that Rupert told her there was an opening. | Rupert’s statements are hearsay and inadmissible without deposition/affidavit. | Hearsay inadmissible on summary judgment; cannot defeat sworn statements that no positions existed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (but-for causation required for Title VII retaliation)
- Emerson v. Dart, 900 F.3d 469 (7th Cir.) (decision-maker must have actual knowledge of protected activity)
- Consolino v. Towne, 872 F.3d 825 (7th Cir.) (speculation cannot create genuine factual dispute on summary judgment)
- Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir.) (knowledge of complaint cannot be imputed; actual knowledge required)
- Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir.) (inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on summary judgment)