Debra DiMaggio v. Ethan Tucker, 288 A.3d 981

In 2009 Tucker signed a $1,150,000 promissory note to DiMaggio that consolidated prior advances and was secured by a mortgage on 1200 Hope Street, Bristol; the note set interest at 11.9% and a 25% default rate.
DiMaggio sent default notices (2010, 2012) and accelerated the debt; she initiated foreclosure proceedings and filed suit in 2011 alleging breach of note and mortgage among other counts.
In March 2012 Tucker sought a preliminary injunction to stop a foreclosure, asserting fraud in the inducement, lack of consideration, and usury; the first hearing justice denied the injunction, holding (inter alia) that the note was not usurious (not raised on appeal), that § 6A-3-303 validated the note as evidencing an antecedent obligation, and that Tucker failed to prove fraud elements.
DiMaggio later moved (April 2012) for summary judgment (not decided then); in November 2020 she filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Counts One and Two (breach of note and mortgage).
A different Superior Court justice granted partial summary judgment in February 2021, applying the law of the case to bar Tucker’s reasserted lack-of-consideration and fraud-in-the-inducement defenses because Tucker had not expanded the record beyond an affidavit that merely repeated prior allegations.
Tucker appealed; the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding the law of the case application appropriate and that Tucker failed to produce specific, material facts to defeat summary judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Lack of consideration for the promissory note	DiMaggio: note validly evidences antecedent debt under § 6A-3-303	Tucker: note lacks independent consideration and is therefore unenforceable	Court: Held for DiMaggio — § 6A-3-303 makes the note enforceable as evidence of an antecedent obligation; law of the case appropriate
Fraud in the inducement	DiMaggio: prior ruling rejected fraud claim; no new evidence contradicts that ruling	Tucker: renewed fraud claim opposing summary judgment; submitted affidavit asserting fraud	Court: Held for DiMaggio — first judge correctly found insufficient proof; Tucker’s affidavit added no materially new facts and failed to create a triable issue
Applicability of the law-of-the-case doctrine given different motions and elapsed time	DiMaggio: prior interlocutory rulings should control absent an expanded record	Tucker: different procedural posture (prelim. injunction v. summary judgment) and long delay justify revisiting issues	Court: Held for DiMaggio — law of the case is flexible but applies here because Tucker did not expand the record with specific facts to warrant overruling the prior rulings

Papudesu v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of R.I., 18 A.3d 495 (R.I. 2011) (summary-judgment review is de novo)
Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417 (R.I. 2009) (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969 (R.I. 1998) (opponent to summary judgment cannot rely on mere pleadings; must submit specific facts)
Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666 (R.I. 2004) (law of the case is flexible where record is expanded)
Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353 (R.I. 1983) (second judge should generally not disturb earlier interlocutory rulings)
Women's Dev. Corp. v. City of Central Falls, 764 A.2d 151 (R.I. 2001) (elements required to prove fraud in the inducement)
Hexagon Holdings, Inc. v. Carlisle Syntec Inc., 199 A.3d 1034 (R.I. 2019) (moving party must show absence of material fact; opposing party must establish material issue by affidavit or other means)