Deborah J. Alessi v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 529

In April 2012 hail damaged the vinyl siding on the northern elevation of Deborah Alessi’s house; she had a replacement-cost homeowner policy with Mid‑Century.
Mid‑Century paid $2,072.53 (actual cash value) to replace the siding on the damaged elevation but refused to replace siding on the three undamaged elevations because the original siding was no longer manufactured.
Alessi demanded full re‑siding of all four elevations so the house would match; she sued for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay.
The policy provided replacement‑cost settlement “not more than the smallest of the following: (a) the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and use on the same premises; (b) the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace….”
Mid‑Century moved for summary judgment arguing coverage is limited to the damaged part; the trial court granted summary judgment for Mid‑Century. Alessi appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether policy language obligates insurer to replace undamaged elevations to achieve "equivalent" construction	Alessi: "equivalent" requires matching siding so insurer must re‑side entire house	Mid‑Century: policy limits recovery to "that part of the building damaged" so only damaged elevation need be replaced	Reversed: "equivalent" is ambiguous here and may require matching; factual questions exist whether replacement is "equivalent" (jury issue)
Whether summary judgment on breach of contract was proper	Alessi: genuine factual dispute whether proposed replacement is equal in value/virtually identical	Mid‑Century: no dispute—only damaged side had direct physical loss so no coverage for undamaged parts	Reversed: material factual issues preclude summary judgment
Whether vexatious‑refusal claim survives if breach claim survives	Alessi: vexatious refusal is derivative of breach claim	Mid‑Century: argued entitlement to judgment on all claims	Reversed: derivative claim cannot be decided where breach claim raises material factual disputes
Whether "direct physical loss" language bars recovery for consequential diminution in value from mismatched repairs	Alessi: hail was proximate cause; resulting loss includes reduced value from mismatched siding	Mid‑Century: coverage only for direct physical loss to damaged part	Court: proximate‑cause principle can link insured event to the broader loss; factual questions remain

ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid‑Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (summary judgment standard)
Cardinal Partners, L.L.C. v. Desco Inv. Co., 301 S.W.3d 104 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (de novo review on appeal from summary judgment)
Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc., 447 S.W.3d 194 (Mo. banc 2014) (defending party entitled to summary judgment when plaintiff cannot prove an element)
Lynch v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (insurance policy interpretation is a question of law)
Mendenhall v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, 375 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. banc 2012) (undefined policy terms given ordinary meaning)
Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. banc 2010) (ordinary meaning is what an average person would reasonably understand)
Harrison v. Tomes, 956 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. banc 1997) (coverage provisions construed liberally for insured)
Bartholomew v. Cameron County Mut. Ins. Co., 882 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994) (proximate cause/direct loss analysis)
Fischer v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 388 S.W.3d 181 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (vexatious‑refusal claim derivative of breach)