Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Parimutuel Wagering
112 So. 3d 157
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013Background
- Act added 550.054(14) to allow jai-alai permits to convert to greyhound permits with conditions.
- Appeal challenged whether the Act is a special law enacted without notice or referendum.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Division/License Acquisitions; Appellants sought declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional as a special law.
- Division granted conversions to West Volusia Racing and License Acquisitions shortly after the Act became effective; Debary and Costa sued.
- Appellants argued the criterion “located in a county in which the division has issued only two permits” creates a closed class; the court later held the Act is a special law and remanded for summary judgment in Appellants’ favor.
- Remainder of Chapter 2009-170 is severable; the trial court’s other rulings were affirmed to the extent not challenged.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the Act a special law by creating a closed class of counties? | Debary/Costa contend only two counties (Palm Beach and Volusia) qualify, making a closed class. | License Acquisitions argues the statute could be open when read with (b) to allow future applications. | Yes; the Act creates a closed class; not open to others in the future. |
| Should subsections (a) and (b) be read together to determine the class? | Debary/Costa argue read together, the law could be general. | Division contends subsections (a) and (b) form a single open framework. | No; subsections (a) and (b) set forth distinct classifications; (a) independently creates a closed class. |
| What is the meaning of 'only' and 'has issued' in 550.054(14)(a)1? | Division interpreted differently on appeal; should defer to division. | Division interpretation should be adopted as agency interpretation. | 'Only' means two and not more; 'has issued' refers to historically issued permits; Division’s new interpretation rejected. |
| Does potential future qualification of Marion County defeat open-class status? | Even if Marion may qualify later, the class remains open. | Future possibility is too speculative to open the class. | No; Marion's potential future qualification is insufficient to make the class open. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof. Reg. (Gulfstream II), 967 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2007) (two criteria for general vs. special law; open vs. closed class guidance)
- Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Comm’n, 165 So.2d 762 (Fla.1964) (open/closed class analysis; rational distinction)
- Dep’t of Bus. Reg. v. Classic Mile, 541 So.2d 1155 (Fla.1989) (closed class indicates arbitrary classification in pari-mutuel context)
- Gulfstream I (State, DBPR v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc.), 912 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (example of open vs. closed class with proximity constraints)
- State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So.2d 237 (Fla.1934) (early open/closed class guidance; historical counting of permits)