2019 Ohio 556
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- On Feb. 19–20, 2015 a 12-inch City water main broke on Ferris Road and leaked onto Stephen and Elizabeth Dearth’s property; water reportedly flowed from ~7:30 p.m. to 3:04 a.m. when the City isolated the line.
- The City had one water dispatcher after hours and used a voluntary/employee‑volunteer system for after‑hours emergency response; three separate leaks were reported that evening (a prioritized Summit leak involved an OSU building and was treated as the emergency priority).
- Dispatcher Burt and Supervisor Craft prioritized the Summit leak, assembled a crew there, and only later located volunteers to respond to the Ferris leak; the Ferris valve was shut off at 3:04 a.m.; repairs occurred the next morning.
- The Dearths sued the City (after settling with their insurer) for negligence, delay in shutting off the water, a faulty water line, and failure to clear a culvert/storm drain, claiming >$31,000 in damages.
- The City moved for summary judgment, asserting political‑subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 and, in the alternative, that immunity was reinstated under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) because employees exercised judgment in allocating limited after‑hours resources.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that immunity was reinstated under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5); the Tenth District affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City is immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) for injuries resulting from its employees' after‑hours allocation/prioritization of personnel and resources | Dearths: the decision to delay addressing the Ferris leak was a routine, operational act (not high‑level discretionary judgment), so R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not apply; factual disputes (expert affidavit) on breach/foreseeability preclude summary judgment | City: prioritization of multiple simultaneous after‑hours leaks involved a positive exercise of judgment/discretion about how to use personnel and resources; no allegation of malice/bad faith/wantonness, so immunity is reinstated under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) | The court held that Burt and Craft’s allocation/prioritization decisions constituted a considered exercise of judgment about use of personnel and resources, bringing the acts within R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) and reinstating immunity; summary judgment for the City affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314 (2007) (R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) may apply to discretionary acts that are not planning/policy‑making; distinguishes subsection (A)(3))
- Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng., Ltd., 6 Ohio St.3d 31 (1983) (historical discussion of municipal immunity and distinction between policy/planning and implementation)
- Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (1998) (three‑tier analysis of R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity framework)
- Hubbard v. Canton Cty. School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451 (2002) (explication of tiered R.C. 2744 immunity analysis)