Deangelo Moody v. State of Tennessee, M2015-02424-CCA-R3-PC

Deangelo Moody was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder (life sentence) for the 2009 shooting death of a 16-year-old; acquitted on a separate firearm charge.
Co-defendants included Martez Matthews and Ortago Thomas; Thomas’s case was severed and he later pled guilty to a lesser charge.
Key evidence: eyewitness accounts of a green Kia, shell casings (.45 and 9mm), a cap containing DNA matching Matthews, and testimony from Quontez Caldwell placing occupants and gunfire in the vehicle.
Moody claimed he was not a shooter and raised a criminal-responsibility/facilitation defense at trial.
Post-conviction, Moody argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview or call co-defendant Ortago Thomas, who at the post-conviction hearing testified he would have exonerated Moody as a shooter.
The post-conviction court granted relief; the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding no deficient performance or a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Issue	Moody's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was deficient for not interviewing or calling co-defendant Ortago Thomas	Counsel failed to pursue a known witness who would have testified Moody did not possess or fire a gun	Counsel reasonably relied on communications with Thomas’s counsel, could not compel Thomas to testify, and had reason to believe Thomas would not incriminate himself	No deficient performance — no evidence counsel knew Thomas was willing to testify for Moody and it was reasonable not to call him
Whether Moody was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure (Strickland prejudice prong)	Thomas’s testimony that Moody was not a shooter would have undermined the facilitation/criminal-responsibility theory and likely changed the verdict	Even if Thomas testified he was not the shooter, jury already acquitted Moody on the weapon charge; Moody was in the car and evidence of awareness existed; Thomas’s testimony was impeachable — no reasonable probability of a different result	No prejudice — no reasonable probability the verdict would have differed if Thomas had testified

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (performance prong standard under Strickland)
Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1996) (post-conviction factual findings are conclusive unless preponderated against)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (appellate review should not reweigh factual determinations)
Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998) (de novo review of legal application to facts)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (mixed questions in ineffective-assistance review)
Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999) (presumption of correctness to trial court factfindings in collateral review)
Zimmerman v. State, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (discusses impact of jury being denied evidence and its relevance to prejudice)