Deane v. Kahn
178 A.3d 403
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2018Background
- Three contiguous riverfront parcels in Lyme: Gorman (west), Kahn (middle), Deane (plaintiff, east). A historic dirt right-of-way ran along the river to Brockway’s Ferry Road.
- 1935: Harriet Warner conveyed the Gorman parcel reserving a perpetual right-of-way “along the route now in use.” Subsequent deeds rarely referenced that reservation until 1955.
- 1960: Caples divided her larger parcel into two tracts (future Kahn and Deane parcels) and conveyed them separately; that deed created express common driveway and mutual boundary easements for access to the upper portions but did not mention the 1935 reservation.
- The lower (riverfront) portions of the Kahn and Deane parcels are separated from the road by a very steep slope, making vehicular access between upper and lower parts virtually impossible.
- Trial court initially found a deeded easement over Gorman and an easement by necessity over Kahn; appellate history included reversal in part, Supreme Court remand to determine whether an easement by implication over Kahn existed. On remand, the trial court found an implied easement over Kahn and that the deeded easement over Gorman remained appurtenant to Deane.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an easement by implication exists over the Kahn parcel benefiting Deane | Deane argued historic, open, continuous use of a riverfront right-of-way existed at and around 1960 and was intended to continue when Caples severed the land, and such easement was reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the lower parcel | Defendants argued evidence was insufficient (no direct proof of use at 1960), and express driveway/boundary easements in the 1960 deed show no intent to create additional easements | Court held evidence (witness testimony, photos, site visits, circumstantial proof) supported an implied easement and reasonable necessity for Deane’s lower parcel |
| Whether post-1935 and post-1960 evidence of use may be considered in proving intent and scope | Deane: later and earlier evidence are admissible circumstantial proof of pre-severance use and intent | Defendants: court should limit proof to use at time of severance; earlier/later use irrelevant | Court held such circumstantial evidence is admissible and Supreme Court precedent permitted consideration of use before/after conveyance to infer intent and scope |
| Whether existence of express easements in the 1960 deed precludes implied easement | Deane: express easements addressed upper-access; they do not preclude an implied easement concerning different access (riverfront) and different parcel portions | Defendants: parties would have expressly documented any intended easement in 1960; express grants negate implication | Court held express grants do not necessarily bar an implied easement; intent must be gleaned from deed plus attendant circumstances |
| Whether deeded easement over Gorman remained appurtenant to Deane after severance | Deane: Gorman reservation was appurtenant to original undivided estate and survived division if Deane could reach it by legal passage over intervening land (i.e., implied easement over Kahn) | Defendants: severance and absence of express reference to 1935 reservation in later deeds defeat appurtenance to Deane | Court held deeded easement over Gorman remained for Deane because implied easement over Kahn provided the required legal passage; scope supported by evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637 (Conn. 1946) (test for implied easement based on apparent, continuous use and reasonable necessity)
- Deane v. Kahn, 317 Conn. 157 (Conn. 2015) (Supreme Court clarified admissible evidence and remanded to evaluate easement by implication)
- D’Amato v. Weiss, 141 Conn. 713 (Conn. 1954) (express easements may but do not necessarily preclude implied easements; intent examined in light of circumstances)
- Sanders v. Dias, 108 Conn. App. 283 (Conn. App. 2008) (distinguishes easement by implication from easement by necessity and outlines elements)
- Utay v. G.C.S. Realty, LLC, 72 Conn. App. 630 (Conn. App. 2002) (two principal elements for implied easement: parties’ intent and reasonable necessity)