149 Conn. App. 62
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Early-1900s Warner owned a large Connecticut River estate that was later subdivided into the parcels at issue (now owned by Deane, Kahn, and Gorman).
- In 1935 Warner conveyed a riverfront tract to Walter Hastings but reserved "a right of way . . . in perpetuity . . . along the route now in use," with no description of location, dimensions, or use.
- The disputed reserved right-of-way was not described in later deeds until a 1955 deed referenced the 1935 reservation; subsequent chains of title to the Gorman and Kahn parcels generally did not recite the 1935 reservation.
- In 1960 Musa Warner Caples split her remaining land, conveying the future Kahn parcel to Marion Sreboff and the future Deane parcel to Charles Sreboff; Caples’ deed to Marion included a common driveway/mutual boundary easement giving access from Brockway’s Ferry Road.
- Deane (plaintiff) sued to quiet title, claiming (1) an easement by deed over the Gorman parcel derived from the 1935 reservation and (2) an easement by necessity over the Kahn parcel created in 1960 when Caples severed the dominant estate.
- Trial court found both easements existed and detailed a broad, regulated scope; appellate court reversed both holdings for lack of proof of location, purpose, and necessity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 1935 reservation created an easement appurtenant across Gorman | The 1935 deed reserved a perpetual right-of-way across Gorman that benefits Deane’s parcel (as part of Warner’s retained dominant estate) | Reservation is too vague: deed does not identify route, location, dimensions, or use; plaintiff failed to prove location or scope | Reversed: plaintiff failed to prove location, nature, scope, or that the 1935 reservation created an appurtenant easement running to Deane |
| Whether Deane obtained the 1935 easement after Caples’ 1960 severance | The easement passed to Deane as an appurtenance of the dominant estate | Severance in 1960 separated the dominant estate; Deane no longer abutted Gorman so cannot use the easement absent legal right over intervening land | Court agreed severance could extinguish Deane’s right absent intervening legal passage; plaintiff did not meet burden to show passage remained |
| Whether an easement by necessity was created over Kahn in 1960 | Necessity arose because the Deane parcel’s lower riverfront was effectively inaccessible for productive use without crossing Kahn (vehicular access, maintenance, docks, emergency access) | Deane was not landlocked; there was access via stairs, road frontage, and navigable water; plaintiff failed to prove necessity or that access was unavailable at time of severance | Reversed: no proof of reasonable necessity at time of 1960 conveyance or of use indicating intent to create easement by necessity |
| Whether an implied easement (by prior use) arose at severance | The circumstances and prior use supported an implied easement when the dominant estate was divided | No evidence of continuous, apparent, or necessary use of the route at the time of severance to support implication | Affirmed that implied easement claim fails for lack of findings/evidence of use at time of severance |
Key Cases Cited
- McBurney v. Paquin, 302 Conn. 359 (2011) (scope of easement determined from deed and surrounding circumstances; limited role for later use evidence)
- Gaffney v. Pesce, 144 Conn. 17 (1956) (when grant omits exact route, practical location and grantee’s use determine route)
- Branch v. Occhionero, 239 Conn. 199 (1996) (burden on party claiming a right-of-way to prove all facts establishing it)
- Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799 (1994) (parcel division rule: divided dominant estate parcels keep easement only if easement abuts new parcel or owner has legal passage over intervening land)
- Montanaro v. Aspetuck Land Trust, Inc., 137 Conn. App. 1 (2012) (easement by necessity elements; necessity may be less than absolute but must be shown at time of severance)
- Marshall v. Martin, 107 Conn. 32 (1927) (historical discussion of necessity standard and when inference of grant arises)
- Kepple v. Dohrmann, 141 Conn. App. 238 (2013) (characteristics of appurtenant versus in gross easements; benefit passing with land depends on intent)