Deandra Miller v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.
20-13390
| 11th Cir. | Sep 17, 2021Background
- Miller filed a putative class action under the FDCPA; the pretrial order required mediation by June 4, 2020.
- Parties scheduled mediation for June 16; Miller failed to appear while her attorneys (Zemel and Giles) attended and the mediator reported Miller’s absence.
- Midland moved for sanctions against Miller only; the district court issued an order to show cause directed to Miller and asked counsel to state whether they had regained contact with their client.
- Miller’s counsel responded that they had regained contact and explained Miller’s work-related inability to attend; counsel also described attempts to reach Miller after June 16.
- The district court nonetheless imposed sanctions on Miller and her attorneys under its inherent power; counsel’s motion for reconsideration was denied and the attorneys appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding the district court failed to give counsel fair notice it was considering sanctions against them and did not make the required explicit bad-faith finding.
Issues
| Issue | Zemel & Giles' Argument | Midland/District Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel received fair notice that the court was considering sanctions against them under its inherent power | Court did not give counsel meaningful notice or opportunity to respond because the show-cause order targeted Miller, not counsel | Court treated counsel’s communication failures and the case history as justifying sanctions against counsel | Vacated and remanded: record shows counsel lacked fair notice; due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard |
| Whether an explicit finding of bad faith was required before imposing sanctions under the court’s inherent power | No explicit bad-faith finding was made; counsel’s efforts to contact Miller show lack of bad faith | Court viewed counsel as failing to investigate promptly and thereby justifying sanctions | Vacated and remanded: imposing inherent-power sanctions requires an explicit bad-faith finding; district court did not make one |
| Whether the sanctions order was supported by sufficient evidence and whether reconsideration was properly addressed | District court relied on assumptions and overlooked evidence submitted on reconsideration detailing counsel’s communications with Miller | District court found no new evidence warranting relief | Court did not reach the merits of reconsideration claim because it resolved the appeal on notice and bad-faith grounds; remand necessary for proper proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for sanctions review)
- Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.) (discussing courts’ inherent power to sanction)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on inherent power and need for restraint)
- Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (Sup. Ct.) (trial court must find bad faith before imposing inherent-power sanctions)
- In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.) (due-process notice and meaningful opportunity to respond required for sanctions)
- United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.) (counsel entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard before sanctions)
- Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644 (9th Cir.) (explicit bad-faith finding required for inherent-power sanctions)
- Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir.) (bad faith may be found where a party delays or disrupts litigation)
