de Ratafia v. The County of Columbia, 1:13-cv-00174

Background

Plaintiffs sued Columbia County, County Sheriff Harrison, three deputy sheriffs (Proper, Hyson, Rose), and private defendant Henry Meleck (aka Wrenn‑Meleck) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law; many claims previously dismissed except a defamation claim against Meleck.
County defendants filed a cross‑claim against Meleck seeking indemnification/contribution for plaintiffs’ injuries; Meleck moved to dismiss that cross‑claim.
The County sought to amend their cross‑claim to assert intentional/malicious conduct by Meleck (rather than negligence) as the basis for indemnification/contribution.
Plaintiffs moved for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to appeal the court’s prior dismissal of Monell and official‑capacity claims against the County and Sheriff and against deputies in their official capacities.
The court evaluated (1) whether interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) was appropriate and (2) County’s request to amend the cross‑claim and Meleck’s motion to dismiss that cross‑claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court should certify interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of dismissal of Monell and official‑capacity claims	Certification is warranted because the Monell dismissal raises controlling legal questions that could be resolved on appeal and discovery may reveal facts supporting Monell	Court observed the issues are not of first impression, lack conflicting authority, and plaintiffs’ own contention that discovery is needed shows the issue is not a "pure" question of law	Denied — §1292(b) certification not appropriate; appeal would not meet the statute’s criteria
Whether County’s cross‑claim against Meleck for indemnification/contribution should be dismissed	(County sought leave to amend) cross‑claim could be maintained based on alleged intentional/malicious conduct by Meleck	Meleck moved to dismiss the existing cross‑claim (which was pleaded as negligence) as insufficient	Court granted leave to amend; Meleck’s motion to dismiss the original cross‑claim denied as moot
Whether leave to amend the cross‑claim should be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)	County: amendment should be allowed; no delay or bad faith; proposed theory pleaded	Meleck: contends amended theory lacks merit	Granted — leave to amend freely given; no evidence of undue delay or prejudice, and futility not established
Effect of amendment on pending motion to dismiss	Amendment would supersede the existing cross‑claim and render dismissal motion focused on original pleading moot	Meleck argued original motion still warranted dismissal	Court held amendment moots Meleck’s pending motion to dismiss the original cross‑claim

Key Cases Cited

Consub Celaware, LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (interlocutory appeal under §1292(b) is limited to extraordinary cases)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (leave to amend under Rule 15(a) should be freely given absent factors like undue delay or bad faith)
Chodos v. F.B.I., 559 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (an amended pleading filed as of course can moot motions directed at the original pleading)
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 101 F.3d 863 (2d Cir. 1996) (use of §1292(b) reserved for cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted litigation)
In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (interlocutory appeal under §1292(b) should materially advance litigation to be appropriate)
Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 100 v. New York City Transit Auth., 358 F. Supp. 2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the third §1292(b) factor regarding advancing the termination of litigation)
Lerner v. Millenco, L.P., 23 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (importance of third §1292(b) consideration)
German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing limits on interlocutory appeals)