427 F. App'x 28
2d Cir.2011Background
- De La Rosa sued USPS after being denied a permanent mail carrier position at the end of a 90‑day probation.
- Plaintiff asserted Rehabilitation Act and Title VII violations; district court granted summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims and dismissed Title VII for failure to exhaust.
- Appeal addresses only the Rehabilitation Act claim; analysis follows McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework.
- De La Rosa claimed USPS perceived him as disabled after a back injury and discriminated against him on that basis.
- Evidence showed his recovery could be rapid; he completed his route the day of injury and could have started a new probation; a temporary impairment is not substantially limiting.
- A FECA disability form referenced disability under FECA, which is broader than Rehabilitation Act disability; physicians’ notes of partial disability were tied to FECA, not Rehabilitation Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did USPS perceive De La Rosa as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act? | De La Rosa argues USPS treated him as disabled after injury. | USPS did not perceive him as disabled; FECA disability evidence is irrelevant to Rehabilitation Act. | No; no reasonable jury could find perceived disability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (three‑step McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Rehabilitation Act claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court) (establishes loading of prima facie case and burden shifting)
- D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (definition of disability for Rehabilitation Act purposes)
- Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1999) (temporary impairments may not be substantially limiting for purposes of disability)
- Rolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (FECA disability definitions contrasted with Rehabilitation Act)
- Bogle‑Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 2006) (abandoned actual disability; focus on perceived disability under Rehabilitation Act)