De La Osa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
208 So. 3d 259
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Bank filed foreclosure; trial court dismissed the case in 2011 for Bank's failure to appear; dismissal was entered "without prejudice."
- Bank received no notice of the trial and did not receive the dismissal order.
- More than two years later the Bank moved under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) to vacate the dismissal as void; the trial court granted vacatur and proceedings (and a 2014 final judgment) followed.
- De La Osa moved to vacate the trial court's vacatur order, arguing the 2011 dismissal was final and the court lacked jurisdiction to reopen it after the time limits in Rule 1.540(b).
- A three-judge panel reversed the trial court (holding Rule 1.540(b)(4) applies only to "judgments or decrees" and not to "orders"). The en banc court vacated that panel opinion and affirmed the trial court's vacatur of the 2011 dismissal.
- Majority held for procedural purposes the terms "judgment," "decree," and "order" are interchangeable under Rule 1.540(b)(4) (consistent with merger of law and equity and long precedent); dissent argued the Rule's text is clear and limited to "judgments or decrees."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (De La Osa) | Defendant's Argument (Wells Fargo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 1.540(b)(4) relief (voidness) extends to final orders or is limited to "judgments or decrees" | Rule 1.540(b)(4) should be read literally; "judgment or decree" excludes "orders," so relief was unavailable for the 2011 dismissal | The Rule's opening language lists "judgment, decree, order, or proceeding" so 1.540(b)(4) should reach any void final order; longstanding precedent treats judgments and final orders interchangeably | Held: 1.540(b)(4) applies to void final orders as well as judgments/decrees; affirmed trial court vacatur |
| Whether the 2011 dismissal (without prejudice) was void for lack of notice and thus subject to relief under Rule 1.540(b)(4) | The dismissal was a final order but not a "judgment" for 1.540(b)(4); therefore relief was time-barred under subsections (1)-(3) and not available under (4) | The dismissal was void for lack of notice and a void final order is subject to relief under 1.540(b)(4) | Held: the dismissal was void for lack of notice and properly set aside under 1.540(b)(4) |
| Whether adopting Wells Fargo’s textual limitation would disrupt procedural law and precedent | Read 1.540(b)(4) literally to preserve finality and textual integrity; prefer formal rulemaking if change needed | Limiting (4) to judgments/decrees would erase decades of case law, impede efficient correction of void orders, and conflict with other rules and precedent | Held: Majority rejects the restrictive textual reading as inconsistent with precedent, rules context, and procedural merger |
| Remedy and rulemaking referral | N/A | N/A | Court affirmed vacatur and directed referral to Civil Procedure Rules Committee to consider clearer rule language |
Key Cases Cited
- Laytner v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 262 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1972) (held that "judgment" in Rule 1.530 includes final orders)
- Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 116 So.3d 363 (Fla. 2013) (Rule 1.530 construed to authorize rehearings of final orders and judgments)
- Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130 So.3d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (applied Rule 1.540(b)(4) to set aside a final order of dismissal when no notice was received)
- Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (vacatur of dismissal under Rule 1.540(b)(4) where agency received no notice)
- Do v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 137 So.3d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (discusses when an order is the functional equivalent of a judgment for certain statutory purposes)
- Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1983) (framework for determining when a dismissal is the functional equivalent of a judgment)