302 P.3d 697
Haw.2013Background
- De La Garza pleaded no contest to first‑degree assault and kidnapping; sentencing was ten years concurrent.
- HPA held a first minimum term hearing on Oct. 12, 2009, setting 18 months minimum terms and noting Level II punishment.
- Letters from the prosecutor and a victim’s aunt prompted a second hearing on Mar. 19, 2010 to hear additional victim input.
- At the second hearing, petitioner and defense counsel attended by telephone; no private conference occurred.
- On Feb. 22, 2011, HPA informed Petitioner that the 2009 minimum term was amended to five years after considering new input.
- Petitioner filed HRPP Rule 40 petition alleging due process violations for lack of disclosure of adverse information and improper second hearing; circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the HPA’s second hearing violated due process by admitting new victim input. | De La Garza argues the second hearing was unauthorized to amend the initial term. | State contends no due process violation; second hearing permitted victim testimony. | Remanded for evidentiary hearing on due process disclosure issue. |
| Whether the HPA failed to disclose adverse materials before the second hearing. | Petitioner claims nondisclosure undermined fairness and opportunity to prepare. | State asserts adequate notice and opportunities were provided. | Due process requires disclosure; issue not waived; remand for evidentiary development. |
| Whether the alleged nondisclosure was waived under HRPP Rule 40(a)(3). | Waiver should not bar review when petitioner had no prior notice of the letters. | Waiver applies; record shows petitioner could have raised issues earlier. | ICA erred; waiver not valid on this record; remand for hearing. |
| Whether defense counsel’s telephone participation at the second hearing violated counsel’s right to effective assistance. | Telephone participation hindered private consultation and full advocacy. | Counsel adequately represented petitioner by speakerphone; not a per se violation. | Not decidable on record; remand for evidentiary hearing; concerns noted. |
| Whether Petitioner received adequate notice of the second hearing’s nature and purpose. | Notice was ambiguous; second hearing’s purpose unclear. | Record shows some notice; the purpose was to hear victim input. | Remand to resolve notice adequacy. |
Key Cases Cited
- D'Ambrosio v. State, 112 Haw. 446, 146 P.3d 606 (Haw. 2006) (minimum-term hearing is a critical stage requiring counsel; protects against misinformation)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (due process requires notice and disclosure of evidence in parole contexts)
- Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993) (due process requires timely disclosure of adverse information for minimum terms)
- Williamson v. Hawai‘i Paroling Auth., 97 Hawai‘i 183, 35 P.3d 210 (Haw. 2001) (parole/minimum-term review demands due process standards similar to parole denials)
- State v. Paaaina, 67 Haw. 408, 689 P.2d 754 (Haw. 1984) (access to sentencing information; fairness in probation-related decisions)