498 S.W.3d 522
Mo. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 1991–92 Gray pled guilty in two Missouri cases and received concurrent seven-year sentences; one judgment (assault) imposed a sentence below the statutorily authorized range.
- Years later, after completing those sentences, Gray received an enhanced federal sentence based on his Missouri convictions and alleged he then learned he had been convicted of offenses he never actually pled to.
- Gray claims his actual plea agreements were to lesser offenses (an Alford plea to attempted robbery in the second degree and a carrying-concealed-weapon charge), that a visiting judge would not accept pleas and he never reappeared for a plea hearing.
- Beginning in 2012 Gray pursued multiple post-conviction remedies in state court (coram nobis, Rule 74.06, Rule 29.12, Rule 29.07(d)) and in federal court; state courts denied relief as procedurally improper or time-barred, and the federal court denied habeas relief for lack of custody.
- The trial court found Gray’s factual claims not credible and that his challenges fall within Rule 24.035 post-conviction claims which he failed to timely raise; those rulings were not appealed and became final.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gray) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convictions should be vacated under Rule 29.07(d) because Gray never pled guilty to the offenses of conviction and was not present at conviction/sentencing | Gray says he pled only to lesser offenses, never participated in a proper plea hearing, and thus a manifest injustice occurred | State contends Gray's claims are claims under Rule 24.035 (voluntariness, illegal sentence) and are time-barred because he did not file Rule 24.035 timely | Court held Rule 29.07(d) relief is unavailable when claims fall within Rule 24.035 and are time-barred; moreover collateral estoppel from prior final rulings precludes relitigation of Gray’s credibility claims |
| Whether Gray received ineffective assistance of counsel warranting relief under Rule 29.07(d) | Gray contends counsel knew the convictions did not reflect his plea agreement and failed to secure/confirm the plea hearing | State argues ineffective-assistance claims are squarely within Rule 24.035 and were not timely raised | Court held ineffective-assistance claims are Rule 24.035 claims, time-barred here, and thus not grounds for Rule 29.07(d) relief |
| Whether Rule 29.07(d) can be used after full service of sentence when habeas relief (Rule 91) is unavailable | Gray implies extraordinary equities justify invoking Rule 29.07(d) because he only learned of the problem after completing his sentences | State relies on doctrine that Rule 29.07(d) is not a substitute for Rule 24.035 and habeas; procedural channels exist for unknown claims | Court noted uncertainty whether Rule 29.07(d) might apply in such unusual circumstances but declined to decide because Gray failed to show manifest injustice; denied relief |
| Whether the appeal itself is reviewable | Gray appealed denial of Rule 29.07(d) motion | State argued the denial is not appealable | Court reiterated its earlier holding that appeals from post-sentencing Rule 29.07(d) denials are reviewable and proceeded to decide on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 2002) (Rule 29.07(d) not a substitute for Rule 24.035; post-sentencing Rule 29.07(d) limited where claims fall under Rule 24.035)
- Onate v. State, 398 S.W.3d 102 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (post-sentence Rule 29.07(d) allowed only for grounds other than those in Rule 24.035)
- Elam v. State, 210 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (Rule 29.07(d) motions asserting Rule 24.035 claims are treated as Rule 24.035 motions)
- Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. banc 1978) (requirements for points relied on in appellate briefs)
- McCoy v. State, 456 S.W.3d 887 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from post-sentencing Rule 29.07(d) denials)
- State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010) (defendant's presence required at sentencing)
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (U.S. 1989) (once sentence fully expired, collateral consequences alone do not create custody for habeas jurisdiction)