Daza v. Los Angeles Community College District
247 Cal. App. 4th 260
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Student Jazmyne Goodwin sued the Los Angeles Community College District (the District) and guidance counselor Igor Daza, alleging sexual assault during a counseling visit to his office; the District settled with Goodwin without admitting liability and the suit was dismissed with prejudice.
- Daza resigned after a criminal investigation and received a $73,000 severance from the District.
- Daza denied Goodwin’s allegations, paid for his own defense, and filed a third amended cross-complaint seeking defense and reimbursement under the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code §§ 825, 995, 996.4) and, alternatively, a writ of mandate.
- The District demurred, arguing Goodwin’s pleaded allegations, as a matter of law, showed Daza acted outside the scope of employment, so Daza could not recover under § 996.4.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer, relying on the principle that the scope-of-employment inquiry was limited to the allegations in the underlying complaint; the Court of Appeal reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Daza (Plaintiff) Argument | District (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an employee seeking reimbursement under § 996.4 is limited to the allegations in the underlying third‑party complaint when the employee denies those allegations | Daza contended he may present evidence (including denying the alleged assault) to show the acts actually occurred within the scope of employment and therefore he is entitled to reimbursement | District argued the scope‑of‑employment determination should be limited to the allegations in Goodwin’s complaint, and those allegations placed the conduct outside the scope of employment as a matter of law | Court held an employee is not limited to the underlying complaint’s allegations; the employee may present evidence contradicting those allegations to show the acts actually occurred within the scope of employment |
| Whether Goodwin’s allegations, standing alone, alleged conduct within the scope of employment | Daza argued some acts (e.g., counseling contact, phone handling) could be within job duties | District argued the alleged sexual assault was not an outgrowth of employment and therefore outside scope as a matter of law | Court held Goodwin’s allegations of sexual assault, viewed as pleaded, fell outside the scope of employment as a matter of law, but that did not preclude Daza from proving the contrary under § 996.4 |
| Whether intentional sexual misconduct can fall within scope of employment | Daza argued intentional torts can sometimes be within scope if they are an outgrowth of employment | District relied on authorities generally holding sexual assaults typically fall outside scope | Court reiterated intentional sexual misconduct is not per se outside scope, but is rarely within it; here pleaded facts were outside scope but factual proof could change that determination |
| Whether public policy/settlement by the employer can bar employee’s § 996.4 claim | Daza argued employer settlement without liability should not preclude his § 996.4 claim | District argued settlement mooted indemnity and supported treating allegations as final | Court held settlement without liability did not preclude Daza from seeking reimbursement or a writ to compel defense; limiting employee to the settled complaint would incentivize settlements to defeat employee claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal.4th 992 (1995) (employee bears burden to show acts were within scope of employment for reimbursement under Gov. Code § 996.4)
- Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 12 Cal.4th 291 (1995) (intentional torts fall within scope only when they are an outgrowth of employment and foreseeable in the enterprise context)
- San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego, 29 Cal.App.4th 1736 (1994) (scope‑of‑employment inquiry under § 996.4 focuses on actual occurrences, not merely allegations in underlying complaint)
- Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202 (1991) (police officer’s misuse of unique official authority can support vicarious liability in exceptional circumstances)
- John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438 (1989) (teacher’s off‑premises sexual molestation of student not within scope of employment)
- John Y. v. Chaparral Treatment Center, Inc., 101 Cal.App.4th 565 (2002) (counselor’s sexual molestation of resident not within scope where employment did not predictably create that risk)
- Z.V. v. County of Riverside, 238 Cal.App.4th 889 (2015) (social worker’s off‑duty sexual assault of minor not within scope of employment)