DAY v. EDENFIELD, 5:19-cv-00506

Background

On May 4, 2018 Deputy Zachary Wester stopped Trevor Day’s vehicle for not immediately using headlights, searched it after smelling marijuana, and reported finding marijuana and methamphetamine; Day and Kimberly Wood were arrested and later had charges nolle prossed.
The State and Jackson County Sheriff’s Office investigated Wester after bodycam footage raised concerns; FDLE later arrested Wester on numerous misconduct and related criminal counts and prosecutors dropped many cases he initiated.
Day and Wood sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging Wester planted evidence, made false arrests, and that the Sheriff was liable under Monell for customs/policies of condoning misconduct and for negligent hiring/supervision/retention.
Plaintiffs retained Roy R. Bedard, Ph.D., a police‑practices expert, who opined Wester deviated from accepted practices, planted evidence, and that the Sheriff condoned a custom of misconduct and was negligent in hiring/supervising.
Defendants moved to exclude Bedard under Rule 702/Daubert and Rule 403, arguing his opinions were speculative, legal conclusions, credibility determinations, and unsupported by reliable methodology.
The court excluded Bedard’s expert reports and testimony in full, finding much of his report was advocacy, contained inadmissible credibility and legal conclusions, and lacked reliable methodology or helpfulness for both the individual claim (whether evidence was planted) and Monell/supervision/custom claims against the Sheriff.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Bedard’s opinions on whether Wester planted evidence	Bedard’s experience and review support opinions that Wester planted drugs and deviated from standards	Opinions are speculative, invade jury province, and lack reliable methodology	Excluded: credibility calls and factual conclusion that Wester planted evidence are improper and unhelpful
Admissibility of Bedard’s policing‑standards testimony re vehicle stop/search	Expert can identify departures from accepted police practices to help jury assess stop/search reasonableness	Deviation testimony is irrelevant to the discrete factual question whether drugs were planted; would not assist jury	Excluded as unhelpful on planting issue; procedural standards wouldn’t assist jury to decide planting
Admissibility of Bedard’s Monell/custom and deliberate‑indifference opinions against the Sheriff	Comparative analysis shows a pattern/custom of condoning pretextual stops and planting that should trigger municipal liability	Opinions are conclusory, rely on isolated conduct, lack department‑wide analysis, data, or standards to show widespread custom or deliberate indifference	Excluded: opinions on custom, condonation, and deliberate indifference lack reliable methodology and amount to ipse dixit
Methodology and foundation (charts, statistics, rumors, camera audits)	Bedard relied on discovery materials, charts, and his field experience to identify patterns and supervisory failures	Bedard failed to review underlying data, did no statistical analysis, relied on attorney‑compiled charts, rumors, and made credibility determinations	Excluded: methodology unreliable (no foundational review, no support, speculative); rebuttal report also excluded

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (district courts act as gatekeepers under Rule 702)
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (court may exclude expert conclusions unsupported by reasoning or data)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to non‑scientific expert testimony)
Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing Daubert standards and burden on proponent)
Frazier v. United States, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (qualification, reliability, and helpfulness framework)
Quiet Tech. DC‑8, Inc. v. Hurel‑Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing reliability from persuasiveness)
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005) (expert must employ same level of intellectual rigor as in practice)
Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (experts cannot tell jury what result to reach or offer legal conclusions)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability for customs or policies causing constitutional violations)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (training/supervision liability requires deliberate indifference)
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (municipal policy/custom must be moving force behind injury)
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (widespread abuse may show a custom)
Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998) (deliberate indifference standard for failure to train/supervise)