Dawn Nowlin v. Jay Pritzker, 34 F.4th 629

In response to COVID-19, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders requiring shelter-in-place, limiting gatherings, and closing or restricting "non-essential" businesses.
Twelve plaintiffs (individuals and several businesses) sued the Governor in his official capacity alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking damages and injunctive/declaratory relief.
The district court granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim, allowed one amendment, then dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice and denied leave to amend a second time.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint largely replaced specific allegations with a repeated, generalized assertion that each plaintiff "lived in fear" and had rights removed, and businesses alleged economic harm and imminent collapse.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal: Counts I–V dismissed for lack of standing (modified to without prejudice); Count VI (regulatory takings by businesses) dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; denial of further leave to amend affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing for First–Fifth Amendment claims (Counts I–V)	Plaintiffs were subject to restrictions on religion, speech, assembly, and travel during orders and thus suffered injury.	Allegations are vague, generalized, and not particularized to any plaintiff; fail Spokeo/Lujan concreteness requirement.	Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for Counts I–V; dismissal affirmed (converted to without prejudice).
Standing for Takings claim (Count VI)	Businesses lost revenue/ability to operate and face economic collapse due to closure orders.	Injuries are speculative or insufficiently pleaded for Article III.	Businesses plausibly alleged economic injury and thus standing may be satisfied (squeaks by).
Merits — Regulatory Takings (Count VI)	Orders deprived businesses of all or substantial use/value of property, requiring compensation.	No allegations of total or near-total deprivation; businesses could use property otherwise; pleadings are conclusory.	Failed to plead sufficient facts to state a regulatory-takings claim under Lucas/Penn Central; Count VI dismissed with prejudice.
Denial of further leave to amend (futility)	Plaintiffs should get another chance to cure defects.	Prior amendment duplicated vague allegations; another amendment would be futile.	District court did not abuse discretion; denial of further leave affirmed.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (framework for regulatory takings)
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (total regulatory takings require deprivation of all economically beneficial use)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (multifactor regulatory-takings test)
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (regulation can constitute a taking if it goes too far)
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (physical occupation is a taking)
Sandy Point Dental, P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 327 (7th Cir. on COVID restrictions and alternative property uses)
Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. upholding similar COVID free-exercise challenges)
Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. addressing facial discrimination and enforcement evidence under gathering limits)