Dawn K. Roy, in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of Brett A. Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480

On July 10, 2008, Brett A. Roy dove into a state-operated man-made pond at World War II Veterans Memorial Park (Woonsocket) and suffered a catastrophic neck injury that left him quadriplegic.
DEM filled the pond earlier than usual in 2008; signs saying “no swimming” were posted but no lifeguards, buoy lines, or other typical safety measures were in place when Roy entered the water.
DEM employees acknowledged knowledge of pond features (lap pool, diving platform, shallow areas, historic sandbar/erosion) and that the pond was sometimes filled despite incomplete staffing and preparation.
At trial a jury initially returned mixed findings (liability on a latent-danger theory but awarded zero damages), later a six-to-one split verdict was accepted and ultimately the jury found no liability; the trial justice denied renewed JMOLs but granted plaintiffs a new trial on all issues.
The State appealed the grant of a new trial and argued, inter alia, that (1) it owed no duty under the Recreational Use Statute and (2) diving is an open-and-obvious danger; the Supreme Court addressed the State’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State lost Recreational Use Statute immunity for a willful/malicious failure to guard or warn of a latent dangerous condition	DEM knew of shallow areas, sandbar/erosion, and diving activity; these latent dangers put users at strong likelihood of serious injury so immunity does not apply	The record lacks evidence of repeated serious incidents or specific knowledge amounting to willful/malicious conduct; statutory immunity remains	Held for State — plaintiffs failed to show the sort of repeated, known peril like in Berman; no willful/malicious failure proved, so immunity stands
Whether Roy assumed the risk or the danger was open and obvious such that no duty to warn existed	The particular latent features of the pond were not obvious to users and DEM had superior knowledge	Diving into murky/unknown-depth water is an open-and-obvious danger of common knowledge; Roy admitted awareness of shallow-water risks and acted irresponsibly	Held for State — as a matter of law diving is an open-and-obvious danger and Roy had reason to inspect before diving; no duty to warn
Whether judgment as a matter of law should have been entered for the State	N/A (plaintiffs opposed JMOL)	State argued that the evidence permits only one conclusion: no duty/liability	Held for State — trial justice should have granted JMOL; Supreme Court vacated Superior Court judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for State

Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987) (diving into water is a danger of common knowledge and ordinarily requires no landowner warning)
Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491 (R.I. 2007) (danger of diving into dark/shallow water is open and obvious; plaintiff held to have appreciated the risk)
Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 2010) (Recreational Use Statute immunity inapplicable where municipality knowingly tolerated latent structural defects with multiple prior incidents leading to grave injuries)
Symonds v. City of Pawtucket, 126 A.3d 421 (R.I. 2015) (Recreational Use Statute treats users as trespassers and limits owners’ duties; statute applies to state and municipalities)
Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 665 N.E.2d 826 (Ill. 1996) (bodies of water are ordinarily open and obvious dangers; law expects persons to appreciate and avoid such risks)