Dawn Brown v. Town of Cary
706 F.3d 294
4th Cir.2013Background
- Bowden, a Cary resident, challenged the Town’s Sign Ordinance under §1983 after a wall sign on his home allegedly violated size and color limits.
- The Sign Ordinance regulates residential signs, with exemptions for holiday decorations and public art; it imposes a two-square-foot area limit and a fluorescence color ban for non-exempted signs.
- Bowden painted a bright orange message across his home criticizing the Town; police cited him for zoning violations and he sought to enjoin enforcement.
- Bowden died during the appeal; the court addressed survival under North Carolina law and whether his §1983 claim persisted.
- The district court granted Bowden summary judgment; the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and held the ordinance content neutral under Wag More Dogs, applying intermediate scrutiny, and reversed for the Town.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sign Ordinance is content neutral or content based. | Bowden argues exemptions show content-based discrimination. | Town contends distinctions serve independent, content-neutral aims. | Content neutral; exemptions justified; passes intermediate scrutiny. |
| Whether exemptions for public art and holiday decorations are constitutional. | Exemptions target content, undermining aesthetics/traffic safety. | Exemptions advance aesthetics/traffic safety; reasonable relation. | Exemptions have reasonable relation to interests; constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. |
| Whether Bowden's §1983 claim survived his death and the standing to challenge exemptions. | Survival under NC statute should preserve the claim. | No survival for §1983; only nominal damages possible. | Claim survives under NC survival statute; standing to challenge exemptions valid. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ladue v. City of Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (content-neutrality and public-sign protection principles)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (practical approach to content neutrality; not formalistic)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (test for content neutrality guidance)
- Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (limits of content-based regulation; contextual analysis)
- Covenant Media of S.C. LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007) (exemption distinctions can be content-neutral with legitimate aims)
- Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012) (three-part test for content neutrality; intermediate scrutiny applied)
- City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (content-neutral justifications must reasonably relate to objective)
- Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (concept of speech regulation and content distinctions)
- Arlington County Repub. Comm. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993) (substantial government interests and tailoring in sign regulation)