Dawkins v. United States
809 F.3d 953
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- John Dawkins pleaded guilty to bank armed robbery and was sentenced as a career offender to 262 months.
- He seeks authorization to file a successive §2255 petition relying on Johnson v. United States (voiding ACCA residual clause) to attack his career-offender designation.
- Sentencing relied on prior convictions for carjacking and Illinois "residential burglary."
- The district court and panel majority concluded the sentence did not depend on the guideline residual clause because burglary and carjacking qualify as listed "crimes of violence."
- Dawkins argues (and Judge Ripple contends) that Descamps and Taylor require a categorical inquiry into whether the Illinois burglary statute matches "generic burglary;" if it does not, the guideline residual clause may have been necessary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson invalidates the career-offender enhancement because the guideline's residual clause is identical to ACCA's residual clause | Dawkins: Johnson applies; if his prior burglary conviction is not a listed offense absent the residual clause, his enhancement is invalid | Government: Dawkins' sentence was based on listed offenses (carjacking and residential burglary), so Johnson has no effect | Majority: Denied authorization — sentencing did not rely on the residual clause because burglary qualified as a listed offense under Taylor; dissent would allow district-court review |
| Whether Illinois "residential burglary" statute is the "generic burglary" under Taylor/Descamps | Dawkins: Illinois "without authority" language may be broader than the generic "breaking and entering" element, so his conviction may not be a listed offense | Government: "Without authority" is equivalent to an unlawful/unprivileged entry and satisfies Taylor; prior circuit precedent so holds | Majority: Concluded Illinois residential burglary fits Taylor's generic burglary definition; dissent: the question warrants further factual and legal development under Descamps and should proceed to district court |
| Whether the record shows the exact Illinois statute and means of conviction (i.e., whether the conviction was under a divisible statute permitting modified categorical inquiry) | Dawkins: Record is unclear which Illinois burglary statute or which means of entry supported conviction; district court should find facts | Government: Sentencing materials described a "residential burglary" and prior caselaw supports qualification | Majority: Did not require further factfinding; dismissed application. Dissent: remand for factual determination and legal analysis under Descamps/Johnson |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopts the formal categorical approach for determining whether a prior conviction is an enumerated predicate offense)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits when a sentencing court may use the modified categorical approach; emphasizes generic burglary requires unlawful entry "along the lines of breaking and entering")
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (holds the ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006) (prior 7th Circuit decision treating Illinois residential burglary as matching Taylor's generic burglary)
- United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2012) (discusses entry "without effective consent" as meeting Taylor's burglary definition)